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From the beginning of recorded history, the Middle
East has been the stage on which unfolded an almost continuous
drama of ascent and decline, of arsis and thesi s, as civili-
sation, cultures and peoples met la the grsat courtyard of the
world and established patterns which had impact wherever there
were man. Unlike many areas of the world, spawning grounds of
less enduring civilizations, the Middle East retained its vital
significance in an unbroken continuum of relevancy to the world
as ages passed » each new act in the drama reinforcing or char-
acterising what had gone before rather than obliterating it.
Quo explanation for the permanence and endurance of the
significance of the Kiddle East lies in the nature of the
civilisations and cultures which have played the various roles.
The Hittitesj the Persians, the Medea and the Parthians, the
Sassaaniar. I the Byzantines, the Arabs and the Monguls, the
Seljuks and the Ottomans met in the Middle East in an almost
continuous position which, perhaps by chronological
accident 3 insured that at virtually no instant in history was
the Middle East an area of only incidental i ance.
But chronological accident is a foolish explanation for











2it has become almost axiomatic that modern political history-
is the history of power politics, it is no less true that the
power configurations erected in the Middle East generated a
dynamic which explains, in large manner, the primary relevance
of the area for so long a period of time. Power relationships
are certainly nothing new. The history of the Middle East,
far older than the story of many subsequently overshadowed
Ires, is the story of the ebb and flow of political, mili-
tary and economic power as it was bom, matured and expanded
through the accessible world.
Power, however, unlike energy, must be exercised. It
must have a rationale, a focus. And power, continuously exer-
cised in the Middle Ea3t since 3000 B. C. had. its focus in
the geography of the area. It requires a very scanty knowledge
of the sweep of history to appreciate the fact that the area
we now call the Kiddle East occupies the position of a link,
in both geographical and historical terms, between the three
great land masses of the eastern hemisphere. Sometimes a
bridge, sometimes a barrier, occasionally a baffle selectively
passing processed elements and retaining traces of the same ele-
ments in the pores of its culture, this has been the Middle
East, and the era of modern history has had an "Eastern Question"
since it began.
In modern times, the Middle East has been the scene of









3importance of the Muslim world continues to bear on the national
interests of the members of the international community, A
facet of this continuum of interest has been the drive of
nations outside the Middle East to dominate or influence events
within the area, even if this dominance had occasionally to
manifest itself in enforcing irrelevance, never wholly suc-
cessfully. In the inter-war period, for example, Great Bri-
tain and France frequently seemed guided in their Eastern policies
by a desire to blanket the smouldering coals of Arab national
consciousness in an attempt to maintain an international status
quo unaffected by events in the area.
A second, and currently far more vital facet of the
modern political Middle East has been the overwhelming force
at work within the area. At a time in history preoccupied with
the revolutions of nationalism in the underdeveloped world,
events in the Middle East assume a gigantic relevancy in con-
temporary international relations as a second generation nation-
alism plays out its role. It would be of primary importance,
in itself, this second generation revolution, were it concen-
trated in virtually any area on the face of the earth. Occur-
ring as it does in an area of unparalleled strategic importance,
the spectacle of modern Middle Eastern politics bears crucial
significance for the entire world community.
Relatively weak in themselves, the Middle Eastern




4relationships among themselves have on the rest of the world.
With the exception of Egypt, each of these states were carved
out of the territory wrested from a defeated Ottoman Empire at
the Armistice of Mudros and were artificially erected by
foreign powers unable to fulfill three mutually exclusive sets
of promises made during the First World War.
It will be remembered that when the Conference of San
Remo met in 1920 to formalize some settlement in the Middle
East after the defeat of the Central Powers, the British had
promised Sharif Husayn most of the entire area for the erection
of an Arab state virtually coterminous with the central core of
the Middle East. Meanwhile, the Sykes-Picot Agreement of
1916 had attempted to formalize an entirely different arrange-
ment with France, dividing up the same territory promised to
the Arabs between the French and the British. At odds with
both agreements was the Balfour Declaration that "His Majesty*
s
government would look with favor on the establishment in Pales-
tine of a national home for the Jewish people."
Faced with the problems of making an artifically erected,
externally imposed nation-state system work in this difficult
context, the force known as Arab nationalism was caught off
1
Indispensable for an understending of the politics of
the period is George Antonius : , The Arab Awakening (London: H.
Hamilton and Co., 193^).




5balance at the precis© moment that it was attaining an organised
momentum and it fra$a«nted» Arab nationalists in, say Iraq,
still clung to the idea of §B Arab nation but by .• the idea
of an Arab nation not structured on RaaJfc* i f;ic lines
was an uncomfortable concept for the Iraquis. In Syria and
Lebanon, nationalism also claimed ardent followers I
to the politically more sophisticated Levantines, schooled for
a feneration in republicanism, an entirely different concept of
such a was held.
Various plans were circulated in the late thirties and
during the Second World War which had as their objective the
destruction of the artificial San Remo borders in favor of a
final effort to give substance to the dream of Sharif Husayn,
and i gypt craftily consented to act as the broker for
a marriage between the semi-independent, semi-articulate poll*
tical entities of the Middle East. Conferring in Egypt in
1944, representatives of the Arab states were able to produce
the famous Alexandria Protocol signed on October 7» 1944 » which
set forth the idea of a League of Arab States. This strongly
popular document was an idealistic statement of a desire for
a strong Arab League, but a compromise measure at best. A
quarter century of effort in building political Stability with*
in the nation-state framework had destroyed onfttth of the cc-
sensus there once was for a single, monolithic Arab state and





6Individualism in the Middle East vitiated even the
Alexandria Protocol, however, and when the Pact of the League
of Arab States was signed at Zafaran Palace in Cairo on March
22, 1943 j it was a far weaker document than had been planned
the previous autumn. In the absence of any rationale of com-
aiity, bloc® had developed within Arabdom jealous of national
power and the League Qm®rg&& as an instrument of Egyptian-
Saudi conservatism constructed to obetruc -4 and Trans-
Jordan in any moves calculated it ,e the northern tier into
a Greater Syria
The strength of the Arab League was not its insides.
Just as the human body, no matter how ill and infirm it may
be at a given moment, is able to rally strength for defense
against infection, so it was with the Arab League. For the
strength of the Arab League was never its friendship, but its
antipathy. The Arab League lived on its desire to be rid of
England and France and to "once and for alln destroy the
growing menace to Arabism posed by the Zionist movement into
Palestine.
2
On the Arab League and its problems, see M. Khadduri,
"The Arab League as a Regional Arrangement , " American Journal
of Intern*. .aw, October, 1946, pp. ffT\ """rae Arab"
'
League, ieveiopment and Difficulties, ,; The World | May,
1957, pp- rt Cross Currents WithiiT^eTrab League, '
ibid. , January, 1943 » pp. 12-25; A. Hourani, "The Arab League
HTFerspective, 5 ' The Middle East Journal , April, 1947, pp.
125-136 an. ularly T. R. Little, **'ftie lr*q League—
A
Reassessment/' ibid., Spring, 1956, pp. 13&-1J
For the text of th"> Pact, see Basic Do currents of the
League of Arab States , Collection Number 1, Ij^XITT?5T~ {$ew
tork: Use Arab Information Center, 1955), W° 9-lo.
MU «*
,**J
7Administered for all practical purposes by the Jewish
Ageney, the British Mandate in Palestine had been erected in
1924 in fulfillment of the promise made in the Balfour Declara-
tion. Little by little, the Agency planned to acquire land in
the mandate to accommodate the rising tide of Jewish immigrants
and as political consciousness matured within Palestine , it
was evident as early as 193 6 that full independence as a
national state was the objective of the movement, '/hen the
Second World War ended, the nationalism of the Arabs had to
contend not only with the parochialism generated by its
division into separate nationalisms but with the horror of an
alien people and an alien nationally \$ within the
very territory considered as the location of its own homeland.
Following the Second World War, events in the Middle
East continued to occupy the attention of the world but for
almost, the first time in centuries, the tU ity began to take
on an ent of immanence. Centuries ago Aristotle had defined
life as mtaneous and immanent motion"; after World War II,
a case could be made for the thesis that the Riddle Bast was
coming to life. No less preoccupied than with the Easte
Question of the previous century, observers found themselves
watching the unfolding of a new dynamic « now had its
origins not be foreign ministries of the great capitals of
Europe but in th-s palaces and souks withii le East.
The focus had shifted from the things which were being done
*'
'
ato the Middle East to the things which were being done in
the Middle Ea^t by persons and forces which ware indigenous
to the area.
The same national interests still obtained in
Whitehall and on the Qua! d'Orsay, to be sure, given added
edge now by the fact that the area had been lately proven to
contain upwards of half the world 1 a petroleum supply, but at
a time when Western civilization was almost literally fighting
for its life, it was difficult to relate the same degree of
encompassing importance to the area which had previously
motivated such total involvement with the Eastern Question,
In this same context, a somewhat curious aspect of develop-
ments in the Middle East stemmed from the fact that the un~
settled conditions in the central core had only a tangential
relevance to the Cold War being waged everywhere else* In
a sense, the Middle East had its own problems after 1946*
After the Arab-Israeli "War" of 1943-49, a certain
balance of power arose in the Middle East which lasted for
seven troubled years. It was a balance in the sense that a
certain perilous equilibrium existed as each "side" in the
conflict refrained from any major attempts at alteration of
the status quo .
Noted analysts were pessimistic about the survival
chances of the newly proclaimed State of Israel, A new
form of Arab nationalism was born in Egypt which seemed to
rekindle the dying spark of Arab Unity and the prestige of







9foundered in the complexities of an ambivalent Arab posture
in world affairs which they either could not or would not
understand. A premium was put on answers and analogies and
the west refused to conceive of a situation where analogies
produced no answers and there were simply too few analogies.
Agitation was a premium similarly within the area as the
troubled Arab nations sought to retain their self-respect
and attone not only for their military embarassment of 1949
but for the fact of the establishment of the new Israel.
When the seven years of "peace" was crumpled by the
events of October, 1956, the anachronism of all out war by
a minor power held a fatal fascination for the world. Con-
ditioned to a world in which war had meant total annihilation,
the fact of a war which bore no risk of annihilation but in-
stead had as its aims the traditional utility of the insti-
tution of war was indeed an oddity. Viewed from the capitals
of the nuclear powers, the Sinai War was a contextual curiosity.
But to the Middle East, it was a somewhat necessary event which
had very definite causes and which should have had very
definite results. As an anachronism itself, it is a
fascinating study,
But more germaine to contemporary world politics, an
even more worthwhile study is the historical fact of the
Sinai War overlaid on the patterns of international organisa-









The old met the new in the wastes of the Sinai
desert, on the Gaza frontier and at Sharm el-Sheikh, as
traditional diplomacy extended itself by traditionally 'other"
means . The old met the new in the great hall of the United
Nations as force was restrained by consensus and somehow in
the process, something really new emerged. For the first
time in history, the forces of the "new" were able to field
an army of sufficient size and prestige to separate the com-
batants and return the situation back to its precarious
balance- Many feel that the entire Suez-Sinai Crisis was
therefore a colossal waste for all concerned, ilgypt retained
the autonomy she claimed over the Canal, adding the new revenue
she had hoped for in nationalization. Britain and France
lost valuable prestige where there was precious little prestige
to go around, Israel was badly and vocally disappointed in the
outcome of her efforts.
There was, however, at least one victory. This was a
war that somebody "won" in the traditional sense of the word.
In October 1956, one nation—Egypt—had access to
both the Mediterranean and Red Seas. In April, 1957, the
same could be said of her hated rival, Israel.
It was a victory in the sense that a political
"situation" had operated through the Egyptian boycott to
prevent Israel from using anything but her Mediterranean
port facilities to traffic in commodities. The same political
"situation" had thwarted her attempts to enjoy what
'
11
she felt were her rights under international law in the face
of armed forces preventing that enjoyment • The same politi-
cal "situation" had forced other world powers, neutral in her
controversy, to honor claims of her enemies in violation of
the same legal standards which they themselves were anxious
to proclaim to the rest of the world. The same political
"situation" had prevented the development of a substantial
portion of her geography.
The victory came when the "situation" was eliminated
•
The opening of the Gulf of Aqaba as a result of the
Sues Crisis reversed these political situations. In the
classic sense, a state had gone to war to extend diplomacy by
other means and while it failed to create a new power structure,
it was able to obtain by force of arms in the field what it
had been unable to obtain at the conference table*
In a deeper sense however, the opening of the Gulf
of Aqaba was a defeat for the international community in the
same measure as it was a victory for Israel. Substantive issues
notwithstanding, the fact of a political advantage being wrested
anywhere on the face of the earth by clash of arms can be
viewed in light of Article 2 of the Charter of the United
Nations as & defeat,
Hie inter-relationship between the forgotten victory
and the ignored defeat is the main theme of this study, although
it is never mentioned or described in just those term3« Vic-
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tory and defeat are relative, to be sure, depending on
aspect and interests* In the question of the Gulf of Aqaba
in international relations from 1946 to 1957 ? the elements
of both are so continually present as to form a counterpoint
well worth listening to*
The main problem of this study is to determine how and





As a bridge or "baffle" between Europe, Asia and
Africa , the Middle East owes much of its history to its
limited accessibility, protected by natural barriers from
indiscriminate use as a thoroughfare for general traffic,
The mountain ranges of the north effectively isolate the
Fertile Crescent from Eurasia except at the traditional
passes of antiquity and to the south, the Arabian peninsula
is isolated from the rest of the world by seas of great
strategic significance • To the east, the Persian Gulf and the
Gulf of Oman wash the oil rich Hasa Coast of Kuwait, Qatar
and the Qmans while the Arabian Sea has been traditionally
the most important means of access to the Hadhramut,
South and west of the peninsula, the Red Sea slashes
the topography with the narrow Bab el»Mendeb separating
Yemen and Aden on the eastern shore from the Eritrean-Somali
coast of Africa on the west. It washes a thousand miles of
some of the most forbidding territory on earth and at its
northern extremity, it splits into two well defined fingers
which thrust further north toward the Mediterranean Sea,
The westernmost finger, the Gulf of Suez, is entered





Suez Canal at the port of Suez is the northern anchor of the
Gulf. The topography of its coasts, spawning grounds for freak-
ish winds, makes it a difficult waterway to navigate and the
current, while well charted, is frequently unpredictable*
While this current is partly due to the spill from the Canal,
the wind in the Gulf made it a one way waterway during the
centuries between the last oared galleys of the Romans and
the age of steam.
Less well known and somewhat more treacherous 1e the
eastern finger which extends from the Red Sea in a north-by-
northeast direction forming a vee with the Gulf of Suez,
This is the Gulf of Aqaba, an entirely different geographical
and topographical personality from its sister. Almost one
hundred miles long, the Gulf of Aqaba averages only fifteen
miles in width and is entered through a narrow valve-like
throat between the island of Tiran and the mainland of the
Sinai Peninsula known as the Strait of Tiran. * Two channels
Ancient geographers considered that the peninsula
jutted into a single body of water and named this body the
Bay of Reeds ( Sinus Aelanitlcus ) corresponding to the two
modern Gulfs. See the excellent charts of the area in Luc
H. Grollenberg. Atlas of the Bible (London: Thomas Kelson
and Sons, 195o).
2
There is no agreement as to whether this throat
should be called the Strait or the Straits of Tiran, The
island obviously divides the water area in two although only












have been marked out through this narrow strait and the
western one, known as the Enterprise Channel on current
hydrographic charts, is the one in use today by normal
shipping. -* Entering the Gulf, the mariner finds himself
in an area of many reefs and tiny islands, the water en-
closed by faulted, steep slopes which rise to an elevation
of at least two thousand feet in the narrows north of Dahab.^
Just behind these slopes, mountains can be seen to the east
and west giving the impression that the ship has entered a
chute funnelling into the face of a constant north wind
which accentuates the apparent speed of the vessel. While
the slopes are occasionally broken by a few rugged wadis,
there is no continuous foreland until very near the end of
the passage northward. There are no trails following the
coast to the west and the ancient one following the coast
from Aqaba to Haqal on the east had to be hewn out of
solid rock centuries ago.
As the northern end of the Gulf is neared, the
mountains on either side seem to dip toward the center to
accommodate the divide formed by the Wadi Araba which
stretches another hundred miles north to the Bead Sea con-
tinuing the impression of a funnel. The northern coast of
the Gulf of Aqaba is only sixty miles south of the northern-
^United States Navy, Hydrographic Office, H.O, 157 i
Sailing Instructions For the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden
(Washington: Government T^ntTng~"5Ffice, 195"2T7~PP. 171-174.
'+These slopes have considerable bearing on the
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most point on the Gulf of Suez but whereas the Suez
traveller enters the Bay of Suez and the metropolitan
area of the city of Suez, no such visual hospitality
greets the northern bound traveller on the Gulf of Aqaba,
The northern coast is almost artificially square*
At either "corner" roughly six miles apart, two settlements
have been made and between them is what appears to be a
wasteland slashed by the usually dry bed of the Wadi Araba
stretching north into the distance as far as the eye c
sec.-* The territory between the two settlements is a
political wasteland, as will be shown, and the topography
seems to emphasize this fact* To the right, facing north,
is the Jordanian town of Aqaba with the only decent wells
in the area and thus the best date gardens. Greenery from
the tops of the date palms is visible above the tops of the
squat buildings and the appurtenances of a light cargo port
facility stretch down to the water* s edge.
To the left is the Israeli port of Eilat roughly
the same size as its opposite number five miles away, but
^The valley of the Araba, the Dead Sea and the Jordan
Valley are part of the "Great Depression" which extends fir
S yria southward through the Red Sea into the heart of East
Africa. See Grollenberg, op_. cit
. , p» 9*
^Eilat is the preferred spelling although Elath is
frequently seen. The word comes from the same root struc-
ture as the na?.e of the ancient Sinus Aelaniticus which
gives it its name. Premier Ben Gurion refuses to refer to
the body of water as the Gulf of Aqaba, calling it insteac






its personality is almost immediately distinguishable from
Aqaba. Eilat is more colorful to look at. Its buildings
are all new and have been engineered with an eye to pro-
viding just the sort of contrast with Aqaba as is mentioned
here. The dockside facilities are somewhat more elaborate
and the squat petroleum jetty with its yellow and green
pumping heads provides a slash of color against the drabnesfi
of the brown earth. Officially designated a ''port" on June
25 » 1952, Eilat is further distinguished from Aqaba by the
round cylindrical oil storage tank farm off to the west of
the docks and if appearances are to be taken as the sole
judge, the casual observer would rate both towns about equal
in cargo handling capacity. Laid out as a modern "city", with
a grade A hotel as a major inducement to an expanding tourist
clientele, Eilat "s 500C inhabitants are occupying an area
which was completely baren save for a police station in 194&.'
7
The first private houses were built in 195$ by a
group of South African investors and the air conditioned
hotel was opened in January of that same year. Most of the
development is done by the Eilat Building and Development
Company, Ltd., formed by South African, Canadian and
Israeli investors, See the Israeli Government, Israel Year-
book (Jerusalem: The Government Printer, 1955), p» 165"^ T5en
Gurion has a deep personal interest in Eilat over and above
the political and economic interests of the government which
will be discussed in this chapter. During his retirement
between terms as premier, he lived in a kibbutz in the Negeb
I has frequently expressed what he calls the great dream
of making Eilat "the Los Angeles of Israel." See Gertrude
Samuels, Report on Israel (New York: Herzl Press, I960),
pp. 40-41 and. particularly the center fold of current photo-






The natural endowment of the region is scanty at
best. The best area for comparison is probably southern
Egypt where the rainfall is approximately the same but
no rivers or wadis, other than the Wadi Araba pock the
tableland to indicate a holding capacity for the 3.5 inches
of annual rainfall. Inland on the slopes, rainfall reaches
8 inches annually but is mostly wasted on the rocky and
rugged faces of the cliffs. Welle are few and far between
and the yearly heat maites grazing a very limited endeavor.
The annual temperature span averages from about 7$ degrees
in January to well over the hundred degree mark in the summer
months, a factor which underscores Israeli determination to
settle Eilat when it is considered that the entire drinking
water supply of the town must be distilled.
Close together are the two air facilities servi:
the towns, complete with two sets of air navigational aids.'
The Eilat airport is an attempt at sophistication in the
desert and is serviced regularly as is the Aqaba facility
which ia somewhat more primitive. The Eilat personnel
8
William W. Jeffries (ed,) Geography and National
Power (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1958),
p. SO.
Q7Royal Air Force, Supplementary Flight Information
Document (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, .nonthly
through "l?62 ) , pp. 42 and 44- See also United States Air
Force, VJorld Aeronautical Chart Number 447 and Is]
Ministry for Foreign Affairs , Facts About Israel, 1961
(Ramat Gar: Peli PEC Printing Works, Ltd.7~I^2)j "p. 107*
i:
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maintain a radio beacon, the terminal fix on the Eilat-
Beersheba corridor and the Jordanian Air Ministry maintains
Eureka direction finding services from the Aqaba tower four
miles to the east*
North from Eilat, the new Israeli highway stretches
213 miles into the heart of Beersheba paralleling the pipe-
line and the new railroad which together make up the ndry
land Suez Canal" described so glowingly by the Israeli
Ministry of Information* Completed in February, 1958 » the
well engineered asphalt highway is one ,'ae most important
factors in the developmental scheme for Eilat. Prior to
this decade, the passage to the Mediterranean from the Gulf
of Aqaba was infinitely more difficult than the relatively
easy passage through the Suez Canal and oven prior to the
opening of the Canal a century ago, the advantages of the
Egyptian route were largely unquestioned* Despite the
difficulty iiis passage prior to the miracle of modern
black-top and diesel, however, governments established in
tho north have frequently attempted to occupy the region to
develop trade with the east and imperial interest in the head-
land of the Gulf can be traced in the patterns of political
geography back to Biblical times.
Early Patter.
The first attempt to trade through the Gulf of Aqaba







King Soloman made a navy of ships in Eaion-geber,
which is beside Eloth . . . In tl of Id<
And Hiram sent in the navy his servant. , ipmen
that had s
'
he sea, with the servants




and brought it to King an. 10
Archaeological evidence developed li thirties
located the ancient foundry town of Esion-geber about fci
miles west of the modern site of Aqaba about five hundred
yards inland and the rate of sedimentation in the Gulf
has beer msly interpreted to place the town on the water.
There may have been two settlements! one a foundry ingeni-
ily designed to catv.h the blast of north wind for forced
draft and the other a maritime settlement, temporarily used
during Soloman' a sea ventures. ~^- The introduction of the
camel into western Asia at about this time resulted in a
busy traffic of camel caravans through the area and in time
tht .age by sea down the Gulf and through the
straits was probably abandoned for the more economical and
character: >s.*2
I0
3 Kings, See also Deuteronomy 2:# which
loth i ) as a stepping place on the £a
an
, :35.
^Leona ttrell (e,!.), T paedla
of Archaeology (New York: Hav e Booles, I. , .* 74.
~ 2Hernann von Wissmann, "On th-~ f Nature 1
Kan in Char:< -of the Dry Belt in Asia, n in ha:; f s
Changing the "ace cT tha Earth, William L. Thomas, Jr.,
do.. (EKicagx : WorlH Books, 1^3^}, ,' .
'<
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The Romans arrived on the scene during the first
century before Christ and administered the Holy Land for
several centuries* The first real road was constructed
to the Oalf during this period but there seems to have
been little trade by sea, if any, through the Gulf. The
Romans did use the Nile for transportation from the east
and since they were in possession of both Gulfs, it seems
logical that they favored the route overland across the
isthmus of Suez and through the Red Sea rather than the
more forbidding Aqaba route. Additionally, Roman oared
galleys were well suited to sailing in the Gulf of Suez
and this was probably another factor which favored Sues
over Aqaba,
The Nabataens of Petra were in actual control of
the area during the early Christian era and again, no
record of trade through the Gulf has been found for this
period.-1-^ The Nabataens were a farming community and
they built their wealth on cereal cultivation supplanted
to some extent by trade with the peoples of the Arabian
desert.
Theodor F, Meysels, Eilat , Old and Hew (Eilat:
Israel Government Tourist Corporation and tb* Local Coun-
cil: undated), pp. 15-24- This vest pocket guide for the
tourist in Eilat is a surprisingly complete history of the
early period,
l^The rise of the Nabataean kingdom owed some of its
importance to its position as a halting place for caravans





Th& first really detailed history ©f the area cg.
cerns the Crusades and considerable interest was shown in
the Aqaba area by King Baldwin of Jerusalem«^ In 1115
Baldwin rode south from Jerusalem with a force of two hun-
dred men to occupy the present site of the town of Aqaba
»
A permanent Installation was made there with a fort and a
bishopric established which became part of the seigneurie
of Montreal which corresponded roughly with the pre-194#
area of Trans-Jordan* To control this Gulf, the Crusaders
found it necessary to establish themselves on the tiny island
of Gesira Firun which lies twelve miles south-west of Eilat
which they named Isle de Grays? To this day, this island
is the only place near the head of the Gulf which affords
protection from the sudden gales of winter but the pro-
tection is far from being a significant factor to modern
ships* Healeias captured the island in 1170 and almost
immediately a the Crusaders abandoned their mainland holdings*
When their attempt to recapture it in 11&2 failed, the
Crusaders seem to have abandoned all plans to hold Aqaba
15
See particularly Alexander Kelamid* *fhe Political
Geography of the Gulf of Aqaba, * Aaaala &£ £fc& kttmcl&Kim
oL m®riQ&i Geographers. , September
, p. 232, which sum*
maris;®s Volume IX of Runciman's History of the Crusades,.
16
United States Havy» ©£. ££fc., p. 175.
i I •-.
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In an interesting commentary on "what must have been a
maritime orientation in their original plan, Very little
trade ever developed, through the Gulf during Crusader con-
trol and for lack of an eastern outlet for trade, the
southern kingdom remained rather poor* The northern king-
doms, with better outlets eastward, survived far longer
than their neighbors to the south who succumbed to the
Arabs in 1169. It is not too difficult to imagine that
had the Crusaders developed any trade in addition to the
sea-shell business which delighted twelfth-century Europe,
their tenure might have been affected.
\!*hen the Crusaders left the headland of the Gulf,
the Arabs showed little interest in the area and it disap-
peared from history for almost seven centuries. In IB36, an
enterprising French explorer, Jean de Laborde made a journey
through Arabia Petra to Mount Sinai and recalling the French
origins of the kingdom of Jerusalem, attempted to establish
a claim on the previous French occupation but the lack of
importance of the Gulf during the nineteenth century during
the period of active French imperialism in the Middle East
prevented his claim from being taken eeriously^?
Modem History
At the beginning of the 19th century, Egypt was a
17






province of the Ottoman Empire , Because of the weakness
of the central government, the Governor of Egypt enjoyed
the position of almost complete de facto independence
from the Sublime Porte «^& Expanding his rule over additional
Ottoman territories in the early century, Muhammad All Pasha
threatened to disrupt the traditional balance in the Middle
East which had become so much a part of the foreign policies
of the Great Powers in the "Eastern Question," and a con*
certed effort was made in 1&40 to contain him. By the Con-
vention of London in 1$40, he was offered in addition to the
governorship of Egypt, the Pashalik of Acre (Southern Syria)
for life, providing he withdrew from other Ottoman holdings.
When he refused to withdraw, an Anglo-Austi'ian military ex-
pedition enforced the Convention but his gradson, Ibrahim
Pasha had occupied Aqaba in the beginning of that year,
Ibrahim had built a road across Sinai to Aqaba to facilitate
pilgrim movements from the Nile to Mecca and although the
provi. of the Convention were never completely carried
out, the demarcation of Southern Syria or the Pashalik of
Acre annexed to the Convention establish for the first time
in modern history a clearly established border related to
the Gulf of Aqaba, Administration of this area of Southern
Syria was entrusted to the Governor of Egypt but the subse-
1?
George Kirk, A Short History of the Kiddle Sast





quent Firmans of Investiture of each subsequent Governor
contained no explicit reference to the Fashalik or to the
Sinai region, Ibrahim exercised some measure of control
over the Suez»Aqaba pilgrim route but for all practical
purposes, there was no Egyptian administration in that
area,
1^
Until Great Britain established herself in Egypt,
the Sinai Peninsula was of no practical importance either
to the Ottoman Empire or to the Egyptians. Sinai acquired
a new value, however, after 1376 as an important aim of
British foreign policy involved shifting the boundary of
Egypt as far away from the Canal as possible, Turkey, on
the other hand, took a rrore active interest in the area as
the possibilities of a Hejas railway materialized and the
conflict between England and Turkey came into the open in
1S92 when the British did not permit the promulgation of
the investiture Firman granted to the new Governor which
contained a more specific definition of the boundaries of
19
L. X« Bloomfield has covered this material with
exhaustive documentation of his
.Egypt , Israel AOd ilia GuH
ff Aqaba (Toronto: Carswell, Ltd., 1957), particularly pp.09-113 - This book is the only full length treatment of
the material on which this study is based, but Bloomfield^
book ifi -written so hap-hasardly and so obviously with the
intention of bolstering the Israeli case that it is vir-
tually worthless in Independent source, Ris thesis, for
example, in the section cited, is that Egypt has no legal




Egypt than was contained in the document investing his
predecessor, There followed a long and unnecessarily
involved series of telegrams which pertained to the Egyptian
boundary, In reading these documents the modern student
cannot help being impressed by the Eritish attitude that the
Ottoman Emperor had gone back on his word* although no
intention to incorporate Southern Syria permanently into
Egypt is indicated in the 1840 document* The Emperor was
claiming that the Egyptian boundary should by rights be
drawn from El Arish, near Gaza, to Sues; only aftez consid-
erable British pressure did the Grand Vizier send an ex-
planatory telegram acknowledging what aight be termed a
prescriptive claim by Egypt with a border drawn from El
Arish to the head of the Gulf of Aqaba* Turkish troops
installed themselves in Aqaba and the matter was considered
settled after Lord Cromer t the British Consul General and
virtual ruler in Sgypt, declared British agreement in a
telegram to Tigranne Pasha, the Egyptian Foreign Minister,
on April 13, -
Under these circumstances, I am instructed to de-
clare that Her Brittanic Majesty 1 s Government con-
sent to the definition of boundaries contained in
the present Firman, as supplemented, amended and
explained by the telegram of the 8th inst. from
His Highness, the Grand Vizier* *« 21







Never adequately demarcated (until 1946), the border
..tinued to give trouble, and in 1906 an incident tc.
place near Aqaba between an Egyptian Army party under the
command of a British offleer and the Turkish troop at
Aqaba, ATter exhaustive negotiations and four separate
counterproposals on strict delimitation of the boundary
determining what was and what was not part of the Sinai
peninsula , Turkey obtained Aqaba and the lands at the head
of the Gulf east of the Wadi Arabs in return for the
cession of an area north and east of £1 Arish which had
been vaguely & portion of the prior Turkish claim. Except
for modifications around Gaaa and the El Auja pocket, this
boundary persists as the Armistice line between modern
Israel and Egypt.
Turkey planned to develop the port of Aqaba in the
first decade of the present century and when the Hejas rail-
way was first conceived, it was planned to construct a spur
line to develop the pore as a trading terminus with the east.
When the British occupied the town in 1917, however, only a
telephone line attested to the ambition of the Ottomans and
there was not even a fishing boat in the Gulf, 22
..lowing World War I and the dlssoluf
Empire, the Turkish portion of the Gulf littoral became part
of the Kingdom of Hejaz under Hussein. As closely as the
22Melamid, 0£. clt ., p. 235
.?>'
2S
HasheBiitss were aligned to England in the twenties, there
was little doubt of the influence of Great Britain in the
area* Meanwhile, Ibn Saud, Sultan of the Nsjd, was being
supported ae a counterbalance to the northern kingdoms of
Faisal and Abdullah and when Saud conquered the Hejaz,
England insisted that a small strip of the headland of the
QuXf be ceded to the Mandate of Palestine and Trans-Jordan*
The Treaty of Jidda in 1927 did not define such a border
but a de facto effective Trans*Jordanian control was recognised
which, wiille never demarcated, exists to this da/ as the
Saudi-Jordan!an frontier on the Gulf. Sa.. dissatisfied
with the arrangement, to be sure, and no traffic is allowed
between Aqaba and the rest of the Arabian peninsula. The
line itself runs inland from a point two miles south of the
rcorner" of the Gulf and ail flat land suitable for
facilities lies in -Jordanian territory. This is the only
Jorda-* outlet to the sea.
,ile no definite boundaries existed between Palestine
and Trans- Jordan during the mandatory period, Abdullah never
claimed mere than the four or five miles around Aqaba nor did
he ever have access to mere. During the Ta In* disorders
in ths late thirties, a road was constru "-lean to
Aqaba. The road was originally Intended to serve the British
^See, for example, S. N, Fisher, The Middle East





garrison* In Trans*Jordan should the normal supply lines
through Haifa be eat by disturbances in Palestine and it
is interesting to note that this road serves the prese
day Jordanian economy in just such a situation as pertains
lay. In addition, a railroad was begun in 1941 which would
have linked Maan and Aqaba in the face of possible German eon*
trol of the Mediterranean and Egypt. If supply through
Egypt were . the railroad was designed to supply the
allied armies in the Levant through the Gulf of Aqaba, but
by the 6 had reached Ras el Nehk about twenty fire
miles south of Mean, victory at el Alemain was assured and
the railroad halted there* Interestingly enough, this line
also .forms a major prop to the Jordanian economy today.
Today's armistice boundaries between Jordan and
Israel generally follow the line of least elevation in the
wadis soutl the Dead Sea and are correspondingly vague
»
North of the Gulf, the Wadi el Araba extends as a reasonably
definite boundary until it becomes almost impossible to
follow north of the airstrip at Qhirandal about forty miles
to the north. Here it follows the Wadi el-Jelb, something
of a geographic fiction in summer, north to the Dead Sea,
Jordan, cf course, no longer uses Haifa and, since
cargo moved through Beirut south across Syrian highways
into Amman is very expensive, she began using Aqaba on a




continuous basis in 1952 and improving its facilities.
Transit sheds have been built all along the water-
front and a storage farm with a thousand ton capacity for
diesel and gasoline fuels has been built. An interesting
sidelight on the political problems of the area is afforded
by the stevedore population of Jordanian Aqaba, most of
them Arab refmgees from Jaffa and Haifa. With the eight
automotive cranes which were installed in 1953 » the port
now has a daily cargo handling capacity of .1,700 long tons.
The north side of the waterfront is now given over to shallow
berths • A dozen class F lighter berths accommodate the
waterborne off-loading of the largest vessels afloat which
can be anchored in the harbor • To the south, new deep wharves
are being finished this summer with the assistance of United
Nations Technical Assistance personnel „ These wharves will
permit the bulk handling of phosphates and will include a
new quarantine station for pilgrims on the relatively
short voyage down the Gulf out into the Red Sea to Jiddah
for the Hadjv Pilgrim traffic continues to be a large
factor in Aqaba' s economic life and the annual rate exceeded
10,000 each year since 1955* Fishing has been developed as
an Industry and a processing plant in Aqaba produces al out
300 tr preserved fish annually. The main ii pert*
through Aqaba to Jordan are foodstuffs, steel, machinery,
textiles and petroleum products and the port is equipped to
handle and store almost as much as the traffic will bear.
.
31
There is unlimited open storage, 43 » 000 square feet of
warehouse space and limited cold storage facilities by the
lighter wharfs. 25 In years when the harvests have been
scanty, as in the 1959-1961 seasons, wheat and flour im-
ports under United States Public Law 4$0 are processed
through Aqaba. Phosphate rock with a 74 percent phosphate
of lime is quarried at Roseifa north of Amman and trucked
to Aqaba to be exported in bags.
Several British steamship lines connect Aqaba with
British and Belgian ports and a monthly German service reaches
ports of the Hamburg~Le Harve range. Cargo moves by truck
from the Nebk rail terminal and while extension of the rail-
road south to Aqaba was once considered out of the question
because of the steep descent of over 5*000 feet, planning is
now actively underway and some track has actually been laid
south of Nebk.
Costs of transportation from Aqaba to the northern
population center averages $30 a ton compared to $39 for the
same ton from Beirut, Political activity in Syria and the
ever changing complexion of Arab politics make the Aqaba way
the preferred one, and it has the additional advantage of
saving foreign exchange. Should transportation through Haifa
25
United States Navy, Hydrographic Office, World Port
Index , H» 0. 9£0 (Washington; Government Printing ttffice
,
1957 » wTth~annual corrections); Sir Archiba :~d, Ports of
the World (London: The Shipping World Ltd,, 1961), and titelamid,







ever become possible, Aqaba* s importance would decline because
transit through Haifa, on the same scale as quoted above,
costs less than $10 a ton to Amman. 2t>
In March 1949, during the laet stage of the Arab-
Israeli war, Israeli troops penetrated to the Gulf. Israel
occupied about nine miles of shoreline opposite Jordanian
Aqaba and established Eilat on the site of the Umm Rashrash
police station; but by 195c, fewer than ten ships had visited
it. 2? The Egyptian blockade of the Gulf was enforced by an
armed station at the entrace to the Gulf along the strip or
cheek of land known as Sharm el-Sheikh, by gun positions
slightly north at Ras Nasrani overlooking the Enterprise
Passage, and by Egyptian outposts on the island of Tiran.
The other island in the straits, the island of Sanifir, is
east of Tiran and hence not much use in blockading the channel.
Although most charts show these waterless and unin-
habited islands as part of Saudi Arabia, Egypt has claimed
sovereignty over them since 1907. The ownership of these
islands has been vague ever since the Sixth century and
reference to them in any recent history is impossible to
find outside the context of the Aqaba question itself. Ben
Melamid, or., cit
. , p. 240.
27Malcolm >/. Cagle, ''The Gulf of Aqaba, Trigger for





Gurion referred to them in a speech in the Knesset on
November 9? 1956, and it would appear that Jewish inde-
pendence on the island of Tiran, known in Hebrew as Votvat.
was maintained at least until the time of Procopius who
wrote in the sixth century (527-565 A.D.), Some time dur-
ing the ensuing century, the colony disappeared.^
The Sharm el-Sheikh ( Ty Sharm >? means cove or creek) is
a strip of territory on the Sinai mainland which commands
the entrance to the Gulf and permanent installations—wharf
and airscrip~-serviced the personnel on blockade duty. The
heavy emplacements at Ras Nasrani were finished in 1953
although temporary mobile batteries on Tiran operated as
early as July, 1951 . The complex was also an important
signalling station during the blockade and, today, the United
Nations Emergency Force occupies the position. 29 jn more
recent times (Spring, 1962}, the coast east of the islands
has been the scene of clashes between Egyptian fishing
skiffs and Saudi patrol launches now that the political
climate between the two nations is considerably more frigid
than it was a decade ago. 3^
Other than the military buildup in southern Sinai,
2$
' New York Times , November 3, 1956. See also Bloon-
field, op, cit.j p. 5.? where he quotes extensively from
E. A. Salpeter, f, A Visit to Sharm el~Sheikh, n The Canadian
Jewish Chronicle 9 February 1, 1957 » p» 11.
29See infra , Chapter IV.
•*°N@w York Times , April 4, 1962.
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little activity has ever taken place on the Egyptian side
of the Gulf. Considering the nature of t>«i Sinai desert
and the relative difficulty of defense and communication in
the further reaches of this area, this is not surprising.
An all weather road once connected Suez to Taba, a police
post just south of the Palestine-Egyptian line on the Gulf.
There are two anchorages on the Gulf other than Eilat and
Aqaba, one at Dahab on the Egyptian side and one at Maqneh
in Arabia. Neither have any considerable traffic and
traffic from Dahab to Suez is a rough track which passes
St. Catherine's monastery, the highest point on the penin-
sula, and oil prospecting in western Sinai has been under-
taken in recent years using this route as a jumping off
point for some deep-well work in the desert. 31
On the other side of the Gulf, the prohibition of
land traffic across the Saudi-Jordan border effectively
seals off the eastern bank of the Gulf from traffic. As
late as 1957 > occasional cargoes were moved up to Manqueh
by war surplus LST and LCI craft which would take on a
load of consumer cargoe at Jiddah and beach it in the wadis
on the shores of the Gulf* Goods would then be delivered to
some of the oases inland by truck but the cost of an opera-




p. 237* The topography of this
area figures in the Sinai War and the Ninth Israeli Brigade
was supplied during vits d-iv- ,hward bv landing <








*gh the Sal if Mudawwara
the On ay
pai'-:.
Few geopolitical gener&lieationa a;-
the Golf of Aqa. of Isra- , ie
attention had focused on it. are, howe\
e geopolitical trend* :•• which are applicable
e area generally.
Control of the region around the Gulf by a state
established in the north could effectively block co: :a~
tlone by la Egypt anc the Arab world,
A severance of this nature suited the Crusaders as well as
it suited the Israelis 1 9« Whether this is a aignifi-
car i a recent years is I to asse.
.
in view reaeed depended land coissunica*:
generally a deareaalng dependence ©n the tr*4
gaoga litary strategy in desert areas.
If at; . -..derations are only ind
significant, oo-ec e question of "trade with
the East is an entirely iifferem >er. Almost aim
move m 1 days oi Mas been
motivated by desire and as haa been shown above * the
half-hea. '. .-is in tb 1 gard were never carried
complete success because a nbe " was

never' needed badly enough by any Levantine 8 bate prior
1948, With Israel established on the Mediterranean, the
blockade of her access to the east was as nat' rom t
Arab viewpoint as her interest in the Negeb as a gateway
the east was to the I&raelis. Sta BM t&f
the new 1 was aggressively embarking on a plan to build
a major* industrial economy from nothing, the importance of
the Gulf of Aqaba as a backdoor to the Levant became acute.
Trade with the East, as a policy, evokes images of
•pica-laden caravans plodding across the desert waste
th© mysterious centers of Cathay., In modern language, ti
pol s translated into more prosaic images of tanker
nail from the Persian Gulf. It became almost izaaed
ately apparent to the Israeli economic plan that without
trade with the Sast» a modern industrial :my based t
machinery and power would be hard put to survive, much leas
grew in step With a rmahroom? jpulaticn. It
obvious to the Arab League at about the §4 hat the
best way t a weed was to starve
ing the Arab~Iaraeli War, the blockade of I. , >egun







Probably the most abiding element in Middle East
politics from the Rhodes Armistice in the Spring of 1949
until the later days of 1956 wa3 the continuation of the
Arab-Israeli War by other means, The guns were officially
silent but casualties on both sides were well into t
hundreds^ as each si- sd in border forays whenever t
balance tipped on© way or the other. Diplomatic
warfare was perfected to an astonishingly acute art as the
Arab Blockade became institutionalised throughout the Midaie
East* The loss of face suffered by the Arab forces rein-
forced the already violent emotional antipathy toward Israel
ing normal inter-state relations impossible dur:
the years which followed s Aimed at the political, ecc
and moral isolation of the new state, the foreign polici
of the Arab League Leas rarely x'eached the high acco
all shares in their common stand against the en^wr/j Ir-r';
Aviv, on the other hand, almost insurmounta^
difficuj faced the infant government which would ha
X
In ft speech before the United Nations on November 1,
1956, the Israeli Permanent Representative Abba Sban quoted
the figure 400 dead and wounded. The latest "official"
.ire, quoted in Facts About Israel
f 1961, p, 19 (cit.








terrified more experiem. • atesraen accustomed to ©perar
from traditional founda* of national power, An expav
ing, heterogeneous population made up of diverse a?
contrailctory cultures was attempting, the creation of a
modern economy in the face of total and complete poverty,
isolation and internal disagreement over even the basic aims
and values of the new state,
During this period of blockade and development, the
Gulf of Aqaba took on a new significance for bot; -;s.
When the State of Israel had been proclaimed following the
termination of the British Mandate in May, 194$, the Pro-
visional Government of Israel had not est . : its "sover-
eignty** to the Beersheeba sub -district of the Negeb owing
(as one Israeli publication puts it with delightful ingenu-
ousness) to the "forceful opposition by the Arabs and the
subsequent military occupation of the area by the UW
3forces of Egypt and Trans-Jordan. "^ In more bl erms,
there was a war on,
cSee particularly Fisher, oj>. cit
,
,, Chapter 40;
Halford Hoskins, The Kiddle East, Problem Area in V Poli-
tics (New York; Macmillan, 195^T» Chapter c
Lenczcwski, The Middle East in World Affairs (Ithaca; Go;
University Press, 195*6), Chapter y, for impartia ' sions
of the problems of the new state, For an inside view, of.
Walter Bytan, The First Ten Years (New Yorkj Simon and
Shuster, 195$ )~» particularly tHe~first three chapters,
JShabtai Rosenne, The Strait of _%i.ran and the Gulf
of Aqaba (Jerusalem? The Government Printer, FT, p a 20 ,
Tnis pamphlet is a scholarly apologia for tf si*














The Arab-Israeli War was a complicated phenomenon to
analyze at the time and it remains so today, but the perha,
over-simplified objective of th© Zionist armies was to
secure as much of the mandated area under their control as
possible, The armies of the Arab states, on the other nan-l
a
acted to prevent this. Because of a host of factors elo-
quently analysed by both sides ever since, the new year 1949
an with Israeli forces poised to deliver the death blow
to the Egyptians in the south. On the evening of December
27, , Israeli forces had actually penetrated beyond the
mandated frontier slightly south and east of El Auja and
were preparing an invasion into the Sinai peninsula under
the code name Operation Ayin,**
Partly because of the British military commitment to
Egypt and partly because the mandated frontier had been
crossed, political pressure was put on the Israeli command
by the threat of direct British military intervention, With-
drawing on the 2nd of January, 1929, there was little doubt
that the Egyptian army had been broken in the field, Mean-
while, on December 2#th, the Egyptian Prime Minister had been
assassinated and wnen the replacement government took office
the following week, it responded to public disappointment
over the progress of the war and asked for an armistice
jFhe following paragraphs are based on th Tor
?imes and the London : < reports for the per: 5 Dec«ffl
94£~to 16 January 19W~and on Edgar 0»Ballance, The Arab









which began on January 7th and which brought the armed g
of the war to an end. Under ar of the armistice, the
Israel move southward into th which lay-
open ana
King Abdullah of Trans -Jordan immediately realised
the implications of this move and invoked his own treaty
with the British and on January & $ 1949, it was announced
that Briti .-rcea would occupy Jordanian Aqaba, This move
has been ;:. ntly "stood
„
Denied the future use of Haifa as a pore, Trans-
Jordan faced the possibility of becoming completely land-
lock; I th© narrow Jordanian toehold at Aqaba were to fall,
While there was no tttgl Cta or assurance given or asked
that British troops assist Glubb's Legion in the event of
further fighting between Jordan and Israel, the government
in Amman did &ft&3 protection of her border on the Gulf and
protection for what was her only port,^
It was not until March, however, that the Isrc1
were able to 9 the occupation of the Negeb , T
advance southward was called Operation Fact smd caus«
considerable tension at a time when the Armistice negotia-
tions were in heated progress at Rhodes, Additionally, as
the column advav southward, the-- British Decani-
ingly tense about the possibility of an armed clash between




their troops and. the Israelis. On March 10, the column
passed the position called Bir Qattar and occupied t
abandoned , station at Umm Rashrash on the Gulf of
Aqaba, h to their own side of the Jor ary
up the Wac.i Arab* and the tension simmered do*: »
In the meantime, the Egyptian Armistice had been
signed at Rhodes on February 24, 1949.
Briefly, Lta conditions were taat La poc
were l -militar Kftd the fighting ceased on the
"west "ront* in the Kegel). This was followed by the
Lebanese Treaty signed at Ras el-Naqura" which guararr
the old Mandate frontier to the north and the Trans- Jordanian
Treaty of 3 which provided for a de-militarized
Jordaniar .order from the Gulf of Aqaba to the Dead
Sea along the line described in the previous chapter. All
He Loudon Tiaigq, March 4th, 5th, ?th and 3th, 1949*
, ,
for an eye witness report at
pages 2 £..£9.
I Treatj Series 2 -;
I .iher,
.lf)c, eit , The settlement with Syria would
have been eompl t immediately thereafter but was
delayed by the coup d » etat of Husni el-£aim, It was finally
I in July, 1949 < The Lebanese Treaty is in Shi
Ros; , .. Vrmiatlce Agreement s_ with the Aj
(Tel Avi 51 ), App T. " Ros .
Israeli ?v it*f%
-*» loc . oit. After December, 194&, when the
west bank of fcae Jordan no longer became the Israeli- Trans-
jordan V iry. Trans- Jordan had been proclaimed the Hashes-











the A.- !*•*&• were to be effected by July 17,
1949, and by that time the "borders" of the State of Israel
as they I ->wn were establish-
first complaints to the Mixed Armistice
Commissior :.ng the Egyptian Armistice was led
the b, a Israel. ramca to ' F and her occupa-
tion of Sir Qattar "in violation of the General krr ,.e
WMSli»* Taken before the United Nations, the dispute
was final!", •jromii 3 when the Security Council was
abl. ,hat Israel!
evacuated ih« Bir Qattar position* Bir Qattar is really
t l|£« on which an asp] ; : had be
erected ar La almost incredible to real de
eon*
.
• pt concerns I imme
geraaine c. of Israeli access to the Aqaba littoral
but was settled without boundary modifications of any •.









ar, Si for tfecamber , 1949 , " gh
December, 1950, p. 124, The settlement was virtually the
only one ever co between these two antagonists on
entirely Xaga The Egyptian Arnistici it,
Treat;
,
. ad not fe i« "western front* furth-
south ti . that . .a | the KAO ws.
effect: a dement. Bloomfi eld's statement










Israel lost no tin setti; a camp around :
Umm Raahrasb po3 ic< aft and this spot, became the site
M of Sila
,
.r miles from Aqaba and five
mile? border met the coast
of Taba, Israel had her toe-hold on the Gulf and her economic
po~ measurably brighter, as the intense public
interest in Operation Fact had served to demonstrate. As a
result of her potential for capitalizing on a position
hitherto monopolised by I , m extension of the war by
other means was now undertaken in earnest to I Iise
wha advantage this position might be able to brir.
The Bl Jar
0;. ;.n command of her own "back door,'7 the
Israelis mad® no M of their pian3 to construct a
port under thv s of the enemy. Eilat became an
Dorado for Israeli public opinion during 1950 and a blue-
print ior a a harbor and a naval base was prepared, -*
To thf <ns, the most vocal leaders of the Arab coali-
tion when tl state fancied itself as a leader, it a
fairly obvious that any proposed Israeli link between the
two seas would be competitive with the Canal and politically
j.esirable, f TOftr*, if the Israeli plans for a moder
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road int I dustrial "complex" a.v
a worl: tint ever materialised, passa.. as thro^
Sue;*, ti - the political initiati-
wou'- :-usly fendai(^ered» Al r> of course would be
added 84 open and gri; Arab &s left after
the actual Armi~ - proel& 3,
Informal economic warfare against the Jewish Agency
was nothing new in the Mi, iast after 1945 but the formal
blockade de l the declaration of Israeli Independence
in May, 1,"--W. spearheaded the economic drive, joi*.
almost iaaaediately by the other members of the Arab Leag
I an effective primary and secondary economic boycott
became a coor . int project, The closure of the 9m
Canal was an important weapon in this prr , applied no
cargoes of "contraband" consigned to Israel, A Prize Court
had been »| , a Decree on Formalities of Inspection
of Vessels and Aircraft was issued and a formal institu-
tionalised program, unaffected by the Armistice Agreement,
remained in forca the troubled seven years b«t**4
arm;
:e the seriousness of t. .onoraic diffi-
itary Proclamation Number 3$, establish^
Prize Court on July 9, 194.$, The Decree on Formalities was
publit 8 an Journal Official of April 3, IS •
,
and Law Nv ir 194-9 { ,,On~tHe Ending of
State of ,
,
50), Th« Decree on Oil
of July 14, 1950, and the Law on the Seizure of Cor: id of
April 4, 1*51, a**e th /ptian statutory basis for the
blockade, 'Moomfield, 0£„ cit., Chapter 2$ the more
accurate Rose.-.
,








cultie3 of the new state, the experience of the Consolidated
Refinery Corporation provides a typical example and serves
as an «a point.
In Kay, 194#, Consolidated Refineries, a British
own- r«| closed down the only operating refinery in
Israel at Haifa when riots between Jewish and Arab workmen
made it sible to continue operations on a normal or
even vaguely economical basis. The refinery was the terminus
of the MLiB pip from the Kirkuk Field in Iraq and had a
through-put cru. pacity which was capable of providiv
most of the needs of the new state. Almost immediately
after the do. of the refinery, the government sei?.
the installation and af I confiscating the derable
quantity of crude in storage at the plant, refined this
confiscated c. ..'or its wartime nee,;3. After perfunctory
otiations collapsed in April, 1949, the government
repudiated the a^reament by which the Company had operated
during the Mandate and delivered an ultimatum to Consol'-i
datei, threatening nationalization unless full production
was restore , In the meantime, Iraq had closed the Kirkuk
supply to Israel in accordance with the blc , and th
Comp&ny was placed in the impossible position of being for*#4
to refine petroleum that it could not obtain with workers
whom it could not hire at a price it could not bear* It was
impossible to move *rud« from the other terminus of the




Persian Gulf via the Canal and after the Trans-Arabian Pice-
line (TAFLIME) was completed to Sides in 1950, Saud. placed a
portal to portal restriction on the crude which moved thro,
it forbidd t to be marketed in Israel, Scon it was found
to toe i*poaaibl« for third or even fourth parties to purchase
Arab oil if t lfcinfttf user was known or even suspected to
be the Haifa refinery* In order to operate, Consolidated was
forced to purchase Venezulean crude and ship it in tankers
to Haifa, a voyage of over 5,^00 miles^
tuations of this nature were repeated with respect
to almost every category of raw material locally procurable
and woiUa have been difficult enough for a mature economy
to bear. Building materials, power generation and trans-
mission equipment, books, foodstuffs- -the list of "contr
band" grew annually, forcing Israel into European markets
where the -hy she gained probably compensated for t:
economic damage done by the Arabs.
The Bio c kade in the Gulf of Aoaba
The question of applying the provisions of the
economy : campaign in the Gulf of Aqaba arose almost immedi-
ately af -eh, 1949, penetration to the Gulf ?>
17their occupation of Umm Rashrash, During the summer,
^See Hopkins, op, cit,
,
p. IG^.
ft A widespread opinion, Professor Hoskins,
writi 1954, i pessimistic about the viability o








little skipping or economic activity of any kind was feasible
because of the presence of armed forces and the transition
from wartime to peacetime operation occupied the attention
the rrotag KStil the weather cooled, By the Fall
1949, however, a concrete vro^r&m. seems to have bean
established with reference to the Gull.
With the concurrence of Saudi Arabia, which still
claimed a vague and ous sovereignty over Tiran and
Sanifir, Egypt &# two islands n in order to protect
id
them from possible damage or violation. *° The full text of
the agreement b ?t and Saudi Arabia for the occupa-
tic :ver been made public, and by the end of 1949,
Egyptian construction began on the Ras Rasrani iiga*llin
station and from the installation of a observation post
there, the elaborate fortifications needed to enforce the
blockade grew.
In February, 1950, the question of the blockade of
the Guli was .jsed in diplomatic correspondence betw
the major seafaring nations and concern was expressed ©V
the apparent disregard of the principle of free and innocent
passage throu
;
i« Gulf. In the course of these discussions,
th© United States was requested to obtain confirmation of a
statement attributed to the Egyptian government to the effect
that the occupation of Tiran and Sanifir would not be
^Verbatim Record, 659th meeting, United Nations
Security Council, Security- Council Offic ial Records t 9th





for the purpose of Interfering with ships enttrifcg or leaving
the Gulf, Accordingly, diplomatic contact wa3 mail
between the Israeli and Egyptian Foreign Q the
unofficial offices of the American Embassy in Cairo. On
January If, L9J0, the Egyptian Foreign Ministry 1 IB
a memo!re to the Cairo diplomatic community which was
ultimately transmitt community tc Israel.
aide memoire contained two par£ a which were carefully
worded to tore the major maritime powers of the inno-
occupation at a time when tr was not much
activity or interest in the problem of the Gulf, The state-
ments assumed r
:
reat significance six years later.
In occupying the islan
,
las wished simply to
confirm its right as well as every possible right of
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in regard to them.
. . .
This occupation is not conceived in a spirit to hin-
r in any way whatsoever the innocent passage across
the maritime space separating these two islands from
the \ an Coast of Sinai. It goes without saying
that this passage, the only practicable one, will
remain tree as in the past in conformity with inter-
national practice and the recognized principles of
international law, y
A similar respect for "the principles of interna-
tional law" was written into Article 2 of the 1949 3a
19
'This paragraph has been frequently quoted on both
sides of the issue and was read into the I of the
Security Council in the 659th meetir bruary 15, 19
Security Gounc il Offic
i
al Records , v. , , , 9,
Ro'senne, GuTT"of AqaSa," £ive" French tnal and a poor
translation appear ' Bloomfield, pj>. cit., "p. 9, Haiti
Eytan, op. cit
.
f pp. . .04, dismisses its importance as a
cynical mo I i purely for the benefit 01 Unit
States and if the statement is tal .
,
seems to have a point.
.
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Arabian Decree on territorial waters and into the 1951
Egyptian Law on the same subject in identical words. These
laws 3tat 3:
The territorial waters of the (Kingdom of Egypt)
(Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) as well as the airspace
above and the soil beneath them are under the
sovereignty of th. , subject to the provisions
of international law as to the innocent passape of
other nations through the coastal sea. 20
Several incidents occurred beginning in the summer
of 1951 which indicated that maritime nations were takir
these declarations seriously and by late 1953, when the
fortifications and the signalling installation were complete
at Has Nasrani, a Notice to Mariners warned all vessels
approaching the Straits to keep a sharp lookout for signals
21
made at that station.' This was followed, at the end of
August, 1955, by a general regulation which m .cplicit
the administrative procedures required of vessels wishiv
to transit the Straits. The 1953 Decree on the '' Procedure
of Ship and Aircraft Searches ana Seizure of Contraband
Goods in Connection with the Palestine War" was amended by a
clause to the effect that all the commodities on the contra-
band list, including newly .. i of foodstuffs,
were to be regarded as war contraband even when » f passi
20fcVUnited Nations Legislative Series, Laws and Regula-
tions on the Rorime of the Territorial Sea, l^FT, p. 52<; .
"Notice to Mariners Number 3/54, February 22, 1954.
^Rosenne, Guljr__oXA<iah«., quotin;; Journal ua Commerc e








Egypt 1 s territory or territorial waters in transit," an
obvious reference to the Strait of Tiran.23 To make it
even more explicit 8 this decree was accompanied by an ex-
planatory memorandum in which it is explained that Israel
was ''showing increasing economic activity and . . estab-
lishing a merchant fleet to handle all its imports from
South and East Africa. n ^4 One of the few exceptions to the
blockade was the Italian tramp steamer, the ''Santa Lucia,"
which reached Eilat in June, 1950, with its hold full of
Yemmenite Jews who were being expatriated from their home-
land to settle the Promised Land--presumably with the good
riddance of the Immam.
In the air, a prohibited area was established around
Sharm el-Sheikh consisting of a circle of 20 nautical mile
radius centered on Tiran:
Fire will be opened at or on to the contravening
aircraft without any previous warning. The onus of
responsibility for any consequential damage to the
aircraft shall devote to the pilot in command. Con-
travening aircraft will be held on their first land-
ing at any Egyptian airport where a thorough investi-
gation will be carried out with the responsible crew.
If the contravening aircraft is being operated
by a scheduled airline operator authorized by the
Egyptian government, such authorization will be liable
to withdrawal* In all other cases, no further permit
to flv over Egyptian territory will be issued to any
aircraft belonging to the owner of the contravening
aircraft , 26
2^
-"Security Council Official Records
,
9th year,




^New York Times, June 24, 1950. This was a highly
emotional Issue in the fifties. See E, T. Martin, I Flew
ftte^.Hom^r ^ gtlsr^s Story oT tittr Yemenite Aircraft (Mew York








While the prohibited gone so erected effectively
blocked direct passage by air up the Gulf, it actually
accomplished somewhat more. In asserting Egyptian sovereignty
over the mouth of the Gulf to the aircraft of all nations,
it established something of a precedent. Through the
acquie3ence of other states, it substantiated the Egyptian
Tight" to fortify and defend the straits and the waters of
the Gulf. Had Israel attempted to negotiate the passa
from the south by air, she would have been blocked* She
was denied passage by air over any Arab land areas and this
Notice sealed the tiny breach by sea.
The Lejgai Aspects of the Blockade
The literature concerning the legal aspects of the
Blockade in the Suea Canal is enormous, but there is only a
small, frequently tendentious body of writings on the far
more interesting problem of the Blockade as it applied to
the Gulf of Aqaba. 2? There is an important difference
between the two situations.
e international status of the Suez Canal is diffi-
cult to contest. Freedom of passage through the Canal is a
^'Shabtai Rossnne, the Legal Adviser to the Ministry
of Israeli Foreign Affairs, is the champion of the Israeli
position and his influence on the noted jurist, L. M. Bloom-
field, has already been cited. Dr. Omar Ghobashy has written
for the Egyptian side. The best works are Charles Selzafc, "A
Consideration of the Legal Status of the Gulf of Aqaba,"
American Journal of International Law, October, I95&, PP*
ol>Cr-"EyW~~ a 'ha Geneva Conference en the Law ox the Sea
and the Right of Innocent Passage Through the Gulf of Aqaba,"




matter of vital interest to most of the world and although
the solid body of treaty law established in the various
international arrangements for the use of the Canal if open
to interpretation and inference depending on the politics of
the inferer, at least some kind of a basis exists for a
juridical approach, although the same type controversies
which cloud the Aqaba issue also pertain to the Canal.
The application of international law to the blockade
of the Gulf is somewhat more indefinite, however, and merits
a brief summary *t this point. Interestingly enough, there
are two mutually exclusive principles of law which apply to
the Blockade in the Gulf of Aqaba which the Egyptian and
Saudi governments were able to maintain until November, 1956.
The first issue concerns the problem of the status of the
waters of the Gulf, the waters of the Straits and the air-
space above the er the international law of the sea, or,
to put it another way, the Laws of Peace. This system of
law regulates the normal legal relationships between states
in their use of the seas for peaceful intercourse and with
the exception of the controversial question of the width of
the territorial sea, is a well developed body of international
precedent.
The second issue arises out of the Arab thesis of
continued beli.rrerency with Israel, which in Vitiating •£
attempt to apply the Laws of Peace to I rs of the Gulf,






e&-- he application of Laws of War, The Laws
War apply to nations which do not enjoy ^normal" peaceful
le,;;al relationships and the right of beli Sers on
those w> 3 an entirely different s
rights and duties under the law.
Both of these legal issues are superimposed on t
Litico-legal implications of mutual lip in the
United Nations, The problem is one which, like every i
problem eormr with the Arab-Israeli conflict, is pri-
marily political. The fact that ths issues are discuss*
in ter rnational law leads many to forget the
political basis for the dispute and to imagine that all
that tfsuld b« required to 30lve it would be a binding
decision clarifying the 1 issues, Obviously the legal
issues are relevant, but if both sides could ever agree to
accept any aft as binding the : ..cal basis
fo: -t would no longer be impossible, In any event,
to th/
,
verridiiu; consideration to the
present d« raination of which body of law to
apply—the Law ace or the Law of War,
Law of Peace, The Israeli government,
indeed t ->vern»ents of most oS! the western powers he
major seafaring nations of the world, view th " of Aqaba
as an international waterway, washing as it does the national
..
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territory of four sovereign states. ° The generally accept
principle with regard to bodies of water of this nature
and the use legally .enjoyed by other nations in times of




. as a rule, all gulfs . , . enclose, by the
land of vers than one littoral state, however
narrow their entrance might be, ars non .terl&l.
They are parts of the open sea, the marginal be]
inside the gulfs and bays- excepted, They can ne ; -
be appropriated] they are, in tine of peace and
war, to all vessel all nations, include
men-of-war, and foreign fishing vessels cannot,
therefore, be compelled to comply with municipal
regulations of the littoral state concernir,
mode of fishing, 2°
us a position based on this principle would take
cognizance of the fact that sin- ,v*pt» Israel, Jordan and
Saudi Arabia share frontage on the Gulf, the Gulf is an
international waterway and a part of the high seas. Regard-
less of the existence of Israel, the Gulf therefore is open
to free and innocent passage by ships of all flags and
blockade o; Gulf, for any reason in time of peace, I
in violation of international law.
In regard to the qxiestion of the limits of the
territorial sea in the Gulf and the interminable controvr
attempting to fix the breadth of this territorial sea, t'
2
°Selzak, oj>. cit., pp, 667~6?6,
2
^L. Oppenheim, Intern al Law, Vol, I: ?«





Gulf is so formed that at im.ay points the m of national
territor ~.*as would "overlap 11 I ; whether a
three, i lit 1..' al
procedure in ial law where a as
this has occurred I 1 on the basis of the national
or international character c.f body of water so lav .-'*
I Israeli position there! foun- as
as does Article 16(4) of the 195$ Convent ic- Terr
torlal Sea and Contiguous Zo
There shall be no m :ion of the U it-
passage of foreign ships through straits
sd for international na ion betv part
of th *oaa and another part of t.
...
Another legal p on that has been advanced by the
champions of the Israeli cause, although nevsr formally
espoused by a more realistic government, is the involv
claim that Egypt is occupying Sinai in violation of inter-
national law. What realistic political implications follow
from this are somewhat difficult to imagine.-'
The Law of War. The Arab position, as night be
,
is not only diametrically opp to th of
-* For e^iaaple, the Black Sea, the Turk "trait -
the Danish Straits and the .a are each useful'
in vary.;: lea in establ: Selgak,
££• cit., passim.
^w Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Cc










view expressed above but is based on an entirely different
set of legal issues. According to the Arab viewpoint, the
entire question of the application of the traditional ma
time rules is based on a faulty premise--that the Arabs and
Israel are at peace, 7' ridical nature of the Rholes
ArEtLst .s the key question to be I . . Thus, while
their opponents maintain that a right of innocent passage
exists for all international shipp.; - . throg h ':'-- Gulf, i
Arabs agree but refuse to classify shipping bound for Eilat
as Inno .. The Arab stares, furthermore, regard the
Israeli possession of the five-mile strip of Aqaba coastline
as a military possession without de jure sovereignty in view
of the manner in which it was acquired^ and in further
consequence of the fact that no Arab state recognizes Israel;
that no Treaty of Peace has ever terminated the 194$ Arab-
Israeli War and that Israel, in occupying the territory she
now holds, in violating the Unite! Nations Partition Plan
for Palestine, deserves no such recognition until she does,
lie the Jordanian Armistice makes a stror, al
case for fci ;-aeli c to occupy t" ction arouv.
Eilat, ths legal nature of this possession is admittedly un-
clear. If, as the Arabs maintain, the 154& "war'1 is sti
going on, there can obviously be no question of innocent
passage th lulf or any portion of it which can be
33 >ra, pp. 40-41.
t KB
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successfully 4 id* by the Arabs until the war 1 lamin-
ated. While the obvious Issue of de facto and. ds Ji
termination of hostilities remains almost completely political
and emotional, there really has never been an adequate legal
agr t on the semantics of the case*. Ax .«•• and
truces are agreements between beli^erent forces for the
temporary cessation of host! f« J. lauterpacht can
be quoted on this side of the argument as well as on the
Israli 1 1 , -ted above
:
A general armistice is a cessation of hostil-
ities which, in contradistinction to a suspension
of arms witn its momentary and local Military
purposes, is agreed upon by the bel. -nts for
the whole of their forces for the whole | >n of
the war. . , . Everybody agrees that beligerents
during an armistice may, outside the line where
the forces face each other, do everything a
anything they like regarding defen< ..^ra-
tion of defence,-5 ^"
While it has been usual for an Armistice to precede
a Treaty of Peace, it may be stated as a strong position
that an armistice agreement does not in itself or of itself
terminate a war.-^
When the matter came before the United Nations on
11
* Oppenheim, og. cit., Vol. II: Disputes,, War and
Neutrality, p. 551.
See Hyde, International Law Chiefly As Interpreted
and Applied by the United Stat e s » I945^eorI'Fion
, p. 17^3
, ""
quoted in Selaak. op . cit . f p. c90, and also "The Natu.
Scope of the- Armistice Agreement," American Journal of Inter -
national Law. October, 1
, pp. £#0-966. Article 37 of the
"fi&gue Regulations" annexed to the 1907 Ha^ue Convention on




September 1, , -'- . y Council passed a stro-
solution calling on the Arabs to lift the blockad* based
on the desire o >> to r a dangerous situation
rather than on any attemp. ing lagal
relationships he-*tween armistices and war.
An additional probi raise i by the fact that as
members of the United Nations, ^.he Arabs have no ri^ht to
maintain a state of war with anyone, To th- , lie Arab
rejoinder has almost ritualistically been that the action
taken in 194# was taken in the name of the United Nations
Partition Plan, a position which might conceivably be
t to substantiate historically. The claim of
beligerent ':,s, therefore, es Egypt in a somewhat
inconsistent position from one aspect, When she announced
military intervention in Palestine several months after the
fighting had been in progress (November, 194$), the Egyptian
delegate was careful to exclude any idea that war was
declared or that a legal state of war was in fact, 3
The text, of the Egypt' 1 the Security Co
kt«s that her forces had. "entered Palestine to i.itablish
seeurit; . order in place of the chaos and disorder vh
prevailed. n^ ' Then again, on August 1, 1949, when the
Palestine Concilia Commission suggested th -.eps I
^ 6See Infra, p. 7?.
W\
1 Document S/743 < 194$.
,"- BM
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taken which would lead to a I Peace Treaty, the
Arab rep *• rep m floor „-he Security




formal 1 with Israel c..-. - <l t ™J
How can the Arabs on the one hand insist that there
is no war but at the same time claim baligerent. rights?
Frequently alluded to by the Israelis as a glaril
inconsistency, the apparent contradiction is actually not
as contradictory in its own context as it might m* The
Arab position, simplv stated, is that £srt >ot an
never existed, i is a political unit occupying Arab
territory in Palestine (but what X«g*l status "Arab terri-
tory" has is still another thorny problem}* this unit may
call itself a state but by its very existence international
law is violated. Hence, while there is no state of
war—a relationship /sen two states-~thers is ample
grounds for the exercise of beligerent rights. Since Israel
does not exist, the matter of a Treaty of Peace with her is
out of the question.
•
In addition to this :aain argument 01 impossibility
of Innocent j. an enemy, two other Arab
:
3S tUllit Z Council* Official Records ,




4, paragraph 3, ar.i Artlcll , paragraph 2,
tne position descr... is paragraph has a curiouc and
cogent lef:al mli<3 1 ,
.J .-. t
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advanced from time to tine which have been formulated with
an eye Tor home consumption rather than for any 3erious
legal n i ations,
first of these positions reLr. the Gulf of
Aqaba to the status of a historical bay, a technical expres-
sion which would confer on it a peculiar status in inter-
national law under which the traditional occupants of it©
littoral would have joint control of the use of its waters.^
The second, position, somewhat «imilar and more emotionally
sd, at . .o the Calf a singular legal status
based on 11 ..torical use as a vital watei I :qt pii-
I tc Meaca from all Islamic states to the north. -
While neither position of it entirely convinein
,
the st ...pport and bolster the Arab ie^ai artillery.
il© no solution can ever be reached independent of
& more penttn political solutlc m other differ-
ences Which divide the two camps, '* one first steps
in an; al framework will have to establish the parameters
that Will be applied, provided a legal basis for
Z -votes auch »pac« to this position in the
article cited with commendable impartiality, concluding that
the issue is for a court to decide.
v and the previous point are strong features of
the Saudi position. See Leo Gross, op. cjt. ; for the Egyptian
interpretation, ;mar Ghobashy, *fne Gulf 'of Aqaba and the
Strait of Tiran. Status in International Law," Egyptian gco-
nomic and Political Review, March, 1957, p. 27
™








settlement is still relevant. In the meantime, if a judg-
ment is appropriate In the context of the present study, the
weight of evidence seems to point to the fact that the Gulf
is an international waterway but a true legal controversy
may well exist as to the extent of and foundation for the
right of innocent passage through the Gulf of Israel and of
the status of the four littoral states vis a vis each other.
Incidents in the Gulf of Aqaba. 1951-3.956
During the years following the Rhodes Armistice, the
Egyptian government intended to deny the use of the strait
and the Gulf of Aqaba to Israel but until Israel could afford
an improvement over the primitive land communications between
Eilat and the rest of the country, it was premature for her
to contest the blockade in the straits with anything more
than continued diplomatic pressure exerted, through the Great
Powers. There was really little at Eilat to fight for save
hopes and expectations of a major seaport. A3 a focus for
Arab-Israeli tension, the Gulf remained relatively quiet
during the early fifties and between the designation of Eilat
as a port in 1952 and the opening shots of the Sinai War, no
Israeli shipping passed Tiran in either direction. The
Israeli economy was in too precarious a position, lining as
it did on ar earns and UJA bonds, to devote much resource to
the vast needs of the barren area. But little by little,









Despite the relative quiet of the period , a series
of incidents occurred in the Gulf illustrating on the one
hand the extreme Arab sensitivity with regard to the blockade
and on the other hand the reluctance (indeed, the de jure
refusal, to coin an expression) of other nations to accept
the blockade or to recogni&e any legal validity of its
measures
,
The first incident occurred when the British
freighter «SS Empire Roach* was fired upon by the temporary
Tiran batteries. The "Roach" was loaded with arms consigned
for Jordan and on the evening of July 1, 1951, In excellent
visibility several hours before dark, she was stopped in the
approaches to the Enterprise passage by an Egyptian corvette
and detained for twenty-four hours. During the detention,
&a Egyptian armed guard was placed aboard the vessel and
the crew was restricted to below-deck spaces until the
following morning, During this period, the British charged
that the Egyptians looted the ship f s store, wrecked the
radio and generally harrassed the British without giving any
reason except that they had been ordered to do so by their
government. An outraged debate ensued in Commons over the
matter and a stiff note of protest went off to Cairo on July
11th, calling the act wa flagrant violation of international
law.«^3
^Bloomfield»s treatment, g£, cit., pp. 12-16, is
basically correct and is verifiable in British and Foreign
State Papers 1 Great Britain Parliamentary Debates, Commons,






The Egyptian reply of July 23, 1951, It -written in
terms so dogmatic and final that Lord Cromer must have
whirled in his grave* In effect, the Egyptians cooly and
civily pointed out that the ship had been west of a forbidden
line established by their blockade regulations and that
their personnel were responsibly taking the steps that they
felt necessary under the circumstances, the "acts of
spoliation* were contested and the general philosophy of
the blockade reaffirmed.*^
Agreement over the matter was never reached but a
modus Vivendi was arrived at whereby Egyptian customs offi-
cials were to satisfy themselves of the "innocence" of the
cargo carried on British ships bound up the Gulf, while the
ships were at Suez or Adabia. These officials were then
to inform the Tiran station "so as to preclude the later
to make /sic/ a further visit or search of the vessel," In
return, all British shipping was pledged to comply wii
"normal practice" when passing through Egyptian territorial
waters. J
The exchange between the Egyptians and the British
over the "Roach" was significant for two reasons. The ship
nc md for Eilat but for Aq&ba. Britain»s presti.
^Bloomfield, oj>. cit.
,
p. 13, in French.
^This somewhat ominous phrase was to cause trouble
later on. The executive agreement was signed by Ralph S.




in the Middle East was at a low ebb that summer following
the Iranian crisis in May. The Wafd government in Cairo
was becoming more and more intransigent in its attitude
toward the Suez occupation by Great Britain and there seems
to have been a political overtone in the "Roach* incident
quite apart from either the blockade or the alleged admin-
Utratlve misbehavior of the Briti.h *
The second element of significance was that the
"Roach* was carrying arms for Jordan, In the summer of 1951,
Abdullah at sixty-nine was perhaps the only rival for the
hegemony in the Middle East that Egypt was conscientiously
building through the Arab League* It Is not impossible
that the "Roach" incident was intended as a "feeler" to
assess the popularity of the old Emir in the context of
general Arab politics. He was assassinated less than three
weeks after the incident,^?
On January 23-24, 1953, a Danish freighter, the
"Andreas Boye," en route from Mombassa to Eilat was detained
for twenty..four hours but eventually allowed to pass.
^ John Campbell's Defense of the Middle £ast (Hew
York: Praeger, I960}, carries a succinct recapitulation of
the context in which the incident occurred, See especially
pp. 40-43.
'''See Lenczowski, 0£, cit
,
, for the details of t.
assassination.
^"'Bloomfieid, copying verbatim from Rosenne, op. cit.
p. 25, without acknowledgment, mentions a similar inciaenlT"
with the- same vessel on March- 10, 1953, which Rosenne places









The following September, a. 3,000 ton Greek freighter,
the ^Parnan," was apparently singled out as a test case,
Carrying a load of asphalt for the Eilat-Beereheba highway
and with a deck cargo of several vehicles, the ship was
detained at Por 1 for twelve clays. The fact that she
was Greek and carrying no military freight was given by the
Egyptians as reason for allowing her to pass and eighteen
months later, this precedent was applied to the *Konitsa, w a
second Greek freighter carrying a cargo of cement (this time
from Haifa to Eilat} which was also allowed to pass,^ The
Italian government immediately protested the passing of the
"Parnon* in September, 1953, because on a previous journey ©f
the same ship Egyptian Customs personnel had ordered the
confiscation of two Italian owned fishing vessels which had
been consi;. ck cargo on the "Parnon* to Italy via
Haifa overland. The Italian consul, in Port Said had vigorously
protested the action at the time and the matter was eventually
discussed I Security Council and a settlement
reached,*"
The first. American ship to be directly involved in
the conflict was the *$S Albion* bound, on December 3, 1953,
for Jordanian Aqaba with a shipment cf UNRWA wheat, When it
49Ca£:le, o£. cit., pp # 77~?£.
Security Council Offie ial Records, 8th year, Supple
ment for July-Se pteraoeFJ 1953 , p • " 737 So cument S/3993; New







enter k* Enterprise channel, the Tiran batteries suddenly-
opened fire on it. Captain James Hasseil, a resoureful
Philacielphian, was forced to back clown and while maneuvering
to icet clear of narrow passage, he repj. i his small
stearni-iA; m with a lar^e American flag and tried un-
successfully ;. c rftlftti Has Naarani by blinker. Eight shells
were fir^d on the "Albion* from astern as it proceeded
outbound but no:.:.
,
^rtunately, hit th<. Ark, Hasseii
immediately hove to in the Red Sea and radioed for instruc-
tions from the American Consul in Cairo, fj the
Egyptian apology was frankly lame in excusing the action on
the grounds that the batteries had made an - in assumi
that the destination was fiilat rather than Aqaba. It was a
sobering warr. o American shipping however,^
The British had cause to enter a protest in t;
Sprir , Earlier, following the "Albion" incident
and a similar incident involving the Italian "Maria Antonia"
bound :;ilat with a badly needed shipment of Sritrsan
meat,-'" the shipping nations of the world n to tak« the
blockade sosr ... - and shipping through the
Gulf dec i to zero for almost fifteen months. C il
10, 19.55, the British tramp "Agrofoec" v. :er
track by shots across her bow. There is Are
^"lCagle, | , . , p, ?#• New York . Dec
?, 1953,
" Bloomfield, 0£. cit








that the "Agrobec" incident would have been soon forgotten
without formal action had not a far more ! i incident
occurred soon after. While the British were deciding what
course to take over the *Agrobec, w relations between White-
hall and Cairo reached a new low oyer the Be, i Pact
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and its implications.
On July 4, 1955, the 6,224 ton merchantman "Anshun"
flying the British flag entered the straits an • struck
broadside by a shot from the new heavy emplacement at Ras
Hasrani. The shell struck amidships near the waterline ar..
,
while there were no casualties, there was cons:
dama^e to the vessel. The irony of the situation was
emphasized by the fact that the vessel had been previously
cleared and was on its way to Aqaba to pick up a ;:.roup of
Moslem pilgrims on their way to Mecca.
^
The "Agrobec* and "Anshun" incidents were debated in
Parliament on July 13 and they served to bring the Gulf of
Aqaba into the circle of increasing Middle East 1 Mki
during the summer of 1955 • A sharp diplomatic note from
J - While there are numerous accounts of the political
climate in the Middle East in the standard texts referring to
this perioa, a real appreciation can be grasped from Editor-
ial Comment, Egyptian Economic and Polit ical Review, ch,
April, May andJ^eTJuT]y7~I753"r and^^fronT'tne Xondon Jj es f
April 15 to May 3, 1955, passim,









Great .Britain was answered by Egypt to the effect that the
wAnshun" had failed to state her destination, $b The British
•octed t.. I rptian rots a: ,3 Jfcpalgft Office issued a
state- • f policy on the Gulf . aring that it was an
international waterway open to all ships. Somewhat sternly,
the statement pointed out that insox'ar as the straits lay
inside territorial waters, Egyptian authorities had the
right to i aforee only such measures "as customs regulations
and public health rules ,*' ambiguity of the 1 - 'customs
regulations'* was never pointed out, however, as the Egyptian
position linked customs and blockade into the same category.
The Egyptian answer to the British protests was a general
regulation issued on August 29, 1955* to the effect that
72 hours advance notice was now required for any passage
through the Gulf, and a statement by Colonel Nasser in his
October 5 press conference that Egypt had 9a legal right to
control shipping in the Egyptian territorial waters of the
Gulf of Aqaba."
This was the same press conference at which the
r i
Soviet Arms Deal was announced.-*
56y T -ontraaicts both Bloomfield and Rosenne, who
claim that the Egyptian answer merely stated that they had
not meant to hit the vessel, but Gagle»s account, loc, cit
,
,
as given here, agrees with press reports of the incident.
See London Times , July 11, 1955, et seq.
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.^anwhile, Premier Ben Gurion made a major speech
at Beersheba on July lQth which addea to the tension and
probably served to crystal yptian response to the
British note. The port Kilat was being completed 30 that
passage to the Indian Ocean coula be a , clare
,
"if necosp,-- >£ the Israeli Navy, Air Fore
,
and Army,*' :.poke of his plans to build t '.lat-
Beersheba railroad and in another major speech on September
25, he answered the new stiff Egyptian Blockac ulation
by prophesizing that nin a year or less, r the situation
would be resolved although he reiterated a previous stand
that he would renew his efforts to discuss the matter with
Nasser once the port construction was completed. ou Israel
had just taken title to two surplus British destroyers,
which r IS " £1.1 at" an! the «Yaffo, T * were bein^ re-
fitte . • ey we' the year,
1,710 tons each with four 4.5 inch deck mounts, six 4C m
anti-aircraft weapons, • ' lit -eorpeuo tubes and a maximum
spe ' 37 knots:.
Ibid.
^These vessels were t) &1 start of the Israeli
Navy. Prior to their purcfeaso, the navy had consi;. of
three ex-Canadian river clasi frigates of 1,445 tons each,
with four 4 inch guns, tec m Machine guns, capable of a
maximum spec... c .. , The :it ? * and the T'Yaffo r
,
former Z type first line British destroyers, were ready for









Wh.i :, evasions continued to mount, the Anglo-
Egyptian tension suddenly began to relax, On November }0 9
1955 | Prime Minister Eden announced that an agreement of
sorts had been reached with Nasser and the agreement itself
is significant to an understanding of how the power structure
in the Middle East was beginning to be altered, It also
indicates ft growing concern in London for the massive
irapli cat ions of the Soviet-Egyptian relationship* the
English accepted the September* 1955, regulations in the
strait, on a de faetc basis while never accc
|
- the
contention of the Egyptian government that they are
I to exercise at the? press -erent
rith regard to shit going to the Gulf of
.
Aqaba. A ;jesty J s Government/ have, how-
ever, accepted these arrangements ,,.* , on practical
grouna$ pending a wid • r s • 1 1 1ement * **
United States, the official posture was to
irritate as few of the touchy principals as possible,
Accor;
,
lowing a normal international practice, the
HydrQr;.mphie Office issued a warning to all American fli
vessels to ' ify themselves prior to transiting the
at the s from Britain as well as two Skory elf.
Sov.; i
, ha Statei - y 9 Recognition and
Identification Guide ^ Shipa (Washington; Government ""Printing





Quote om Parliamentary Debates. Commons, Third
Series, Vol. 546, Cfel. \ \ vember 30, i95'$» and Vol*








straits ** and four weeks later the complete text of the
yptian revision to the regulations concerning the blockade
was proxaul. verbatim without comment.*^
The Blockade Before the United Nations
Under the terms of the Armistice of RtK en
pt and Israel, a Kixed Armisr Commission was established
to execute ita provisions and clociae on procedural and sub-
stantive matters concerning the m of th< ;, ' On
question of principle, there was a provision for a|>j fttHi
a decision of the Commission to a special committee ecmppfd
Of the United lotions Chief of Staff of zhc Ti upervision
66Organisation and one Israeli and one Kgyptilin member.
In the late summer of 1950 , an appeal was made to
this special committee against a decision by t.' Armis-
tice Commission which had ruled that the matter of the Sues
Canal Blockade was a matter out. the scope of its compe-
tence!, but while this appeal was still pending, Israel brought
the matter before the Security Council on September 16. '
°-*!lotice to Mariners, No. 40, October 1, 1955,
U.S. Navy ^orographic Office, NOTAM SPMKaRY OCT 19*15, 1955
(mimeographed, looseleaf).
Notice to T4ariners, No, 44, October 2?, 1955,
ibid
^Article 10.
66Article 10, para, 4.
67
'Security Council Official Records, 5th --Tar, Supple-
ment for Sept:
, 1950, pi W% document 3/1794.*
.J
72
The Council refused to consider the matter until the
committee had reported a sionu and by June 12, 1951, by
the aeci . vote cast by Lieutenant General Riley, the
United Nations Chief of Staff, the committee agreed with the
Mixed Armistice Commission that it did not have the right
to demand a suspension of the Suez blockade from Egypt. '
This ruling in effect opened the way for a full aress
Security Council consideration of the entire matter of the
Suez Blockade and on September 1, 1951, a lengthy Resolution
was passed calling upon Egypt "to terminate the restriction
on the passage of international commercial shipping and
xts through the Suez Canal . . . and cease all inter-
ference with such shipping."'^
Egypt ignored the resolution.
After the incidents in the Gulf of Aqaba described
above indicated th ypt had every intention of applyi
the same measures to the Gulf, Israel once again coraplair
against Egypt following the "Albion" and "Maria Antonia'-'
incidents, at & time when she felt she could muster t*
support. vote a resolution through which would
6




urity ii Offi cial Records, 6th year, Supple-
pril-June, 1951, p. lo2", Document 3/2194.
70
Sec .;,._yOunc il. Official riecoras, oth year, Imeet-
ing 55$, P. 2, Document I
;
y232"2g fhe sentence quoted is the
last sentence of the resolution. The sponsors were the United








specifically apply to the Gulf , ' This time, she r«qu«atj
action a. p% by fch< .ncii , ; -compliance
With the 1951 Resolution adding the additional charge for
"interference , * , with shipping proceeding t. Israeli
port of , on the Gulf of Aqaba," ifi 1 Sir
Lbc
,
1 Mew Zealand Representative to sponsor it. f
She also submitted an explanatory memora" :hich the
veiopment of the blockade since 1951 was tra . fJ> The
Resolution was introduced on March 24, 1954, ..'•" -44th
meeting of th urity Council calling on Egypt to cc - J
with the prior resolution and which also contaj :he
provision that the Aqaba question would b to the
Mixed krm Commission "in the first instance , , , with-
out pre,;. , ' > Lebanon and the Soviet Union ;ainst
the measure and the cioor MM closed, by I ,n veto,
for any further Security Council action on locks
qu ' ,
'71
£ii££i» P r - 65-66.
*^B] ,'iela, 0j>, clt . t p, 47,
IJ Security icil Official Records, 9th year, Supple-
ment Pi uary-March, 1954, pp. "!-£, Document 3/3168,
Ik
was a procedural move designed to preclude
the MAC from hat i1 i not have competence, re-
peating the X951 experience, Abba £ban, the Israel re]
aent&tive, took the veto with bitterness, §££^rit^_Co3ir^il







Deteriorati on of Stability—1955-1956
The complicated politics of the 1955-195& period
form the background setting for the next phase of the Aqaba
story, and a brief resume of some ox the more important
events of that period, as they bear on the main topic of
study, is now in oraer. It will be remembered that in
February, 1955, after long and occasionally bitter exchanges
between the supporting Hashemite-oriented camp and the
opposing Egyptian orientea camp, the Baghdad Pact wa3 signed
drawing Iraq into the western alliance system to the
consummate disgust of President Nasser. At the same time,
Israel began a particularly vicious and savage series of
raids across the armistice lines into Gaza and the combina-
tion of these two events placed the issue of modern arms
wail into the forefront of Egyptian policy considerations.
The subsequent "commando" raids &gypt launched in retaliation
were devices to arouse Egyptian public opinion and to dis-
guise Egyptian weakness^ and by November, 1955, Nasser was
inventing counter-attacks for this purpose. The fedayeen
program was just getting unaer way on the scale originally
planned.
'
In April, 1955, meanwhile, Nasser had attended the
'^Peter Partner, A Short Political Guide to the Arab
World (New York: Praeger, 1960J, p. 75.
'^Wilton Wynn, Nasser of Egypt (Cambridge: Arlington











Bandung Gonferenes of Asian Powers where he met Chou en-Lai
and in the Spring and Summer of 1955, a new line emerged
in the troubled Middle East which was typified by the now
famous Caechoslovakian Arms Agreement. The prospects of a
Moscow-Cairo axis troubled the western powers considerably^'
to say nothing of the obvious Israeli concern, It was
fairly clear that the arms Nasser was obtaining from the
Eastern Bloc were designed for ground warfare against Israel
and the western concern, quite naturally, was that the supply
of petroleum from the Middle East would be cut as soon as
any major outbreak of hostilities occurred or even, possibly,
as a prelude to such an outbreak.
The Security Council gave renewed consideration to
the events in the Middle East during the early part of 1956,
particularly to the Israeli attacks against the Gaza Strip,
Over the vigorous protests of the Israelis, an encompassing
resolution was passed on June 4, 1956/ which took note of
the inflammatory actions on both sides but made little
reference to the blockade. Secretary General Hammerskjold
had been surveying the general situation since April 4 under
a previous Security Council Resolution but in a statement on
April 16, 1956, he announced that his interpretation of the
' 'John Spanier, Ameri can Foreign Policy Since World
War II (New York: Praeger, 1961), pp. 119-120.
7^3ee New York Times
f











Security Council mandate gave him no authority to deal with
the blockade question itself, f7 He was able to arrange a
"cease fire M by conciliation on April 18,
In order to dramatise the blockade at a time when
Israel was coming in for censure for her own actions, the
"Panagia" incident was manufactured61 out of Egyptian refusal
to allow this Greek ship to transit the Canal on May 25,
1956, It was a Greek vessel loaded with cement bound from
Haifa to Eilat, at what was probably the most inauspicious
moment in history for a trouble-free voyage, and was detained
at Port Said from May 25 to September £, 1956, while its
&2presence was milked for propaganda by both sides. "*"
On June 16 the last contingent of British soldiers
83left the Canal &one la accordance with the 1954 Treaty;
Shepilov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, was entertained in
Cairo at a three day celebration * and the orientation of
^Rosennej Gulf of Aqaba, p. 2'; ?e also New York
Times, April 1#, ±9$67~
QHew York Times, April 19 and 20, .1956,
""This judgment is original in view of the context
in which the incident occurred, Obviously, the Israel govern-
ment needed sympathy in the United Natior. . on balance,.






84New York Times , June 21, 23, 2$, 26, 1956.
'Fisher, o_p, cit., PP» 621-622, provides an excel-









the "new11 Egyptian foreign policy was now causing serious
concern in the foreign ministries of x,he western world.
Pending throughout the summer was the American offer
to finance part of the development cost of the Aswan High
Dam project, In mid- July, Ahmed Hussein, the Egyptian
Ambassador to the United States, returned to Washington from
Cairo with instructions to notify Secretary Dulles of Nasser's
decision to accept the aid offer, but on July 19, 1956, in
possibly one of the most fateful decisions in recent history,
Dulles withdrew the offer, J
The retraction was a heavy blow to Egyptian hopes,
since the American loan had. been the prerequisite for World
Bank and British participation in the project, offers which
#6
were also immediately withdrawn.
The withdrawal of the Aswan offer was the spark which
ignited the tii*der box.
The biaae began, slowly at first, which would soon
engulf the Kiddle East in one of the most bizarre events of
modern times, bringing the last of the old political world
into sharp contact with the new,
^£ s^at^, quo was about to be radically altarad.
85 See John R 9 Seal, John Foster Dulles, l3S3-ly59
(New York: Harper Brothers, 1959}* pp. 247-259' for~the tack.
ground, ..ecretary Dulles 1 comment on the fjeal analysis,
see bil press conference of April 2, 1957, in the New York
Times, April 3, 1957,











THE SINAI CAMPAIGN IN THE SOUTH
The Sues Crisis was one of the most significant events
of the last decade. It has been effectively chronicled,
analyzed, regretted, defended and interpreted so many times
in the last few years that for the purposes of this study,
only the more obscure implications of the events in the
southern Sinai peninsula need be explored in any great detail.
The Sues Crisis began, if a beginning must be estab-
lished, with the nationalization of the Suez Canal on the
evening of July 26, 1956. 2 The decision to nationalize had
3
not been a hasty one but within the framework of the politi-
cal context in which it was made, it was taken by Great
Britain and France as something not far short of a declara-
tion of war. There were four separable issues which disturbed
the West but paramount was the fear engendered by Nasser's
i
A good approach to a thorough understanding of the
series of events known popularly as the "Suez Crisis" might
be the simultaneous examination of the accounts of the last
half of 1956 in Beal, or.
.cjLt*, pp. 246-306, for the Ameri-
can orientation; in Anthony Eden, Bill Circle (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co,, I960), pp, 437~o54> for the British
orientation; in Merry and Serge Bromberger, Secrets of Suez
,
trans, by James Cameron (London; Sidgewick and Jackson', Ltd.,
1957), for what is purported to be the French orientatic
All are more or less mutually contradictory 00 many points *
^Michael Adams, Suez and After (Boston; Beacon Press,
195& )» pp. l-6\






new ability to close the Canal at some unforseen time and
thus jeopardize the security and economy of whatever nation
he chose, ominously underscored by his increasing closeness
with the Soviet Bloc^ Secondly, there was the matter of
doubt as to the ability of the Egyptians to handle the
mechanical and administrative details of the operation,
There was, thirdlyj a great prestige factor a considered,
The events of July began to look more and more each day like
a great Egyptian political victory gained with the assistance
of neutralist India and the Soviet Bloc. Finally, there were
a maze of economic considerations not the least of which
was the fact that the Canal itself would add little to the
building costs of the Aswan Dam unless major changes were intro-
duced la the economic regime of the Canal and a concern over
capital improvement of the Canal itself was deep on all
quarters .^ By the end of October, 1956, with the United
States in the throes of a presidential election and under the
impression that the crisis caused by the nationalization was
cooling off, the Israeli army had fully mobilised and the French
and British combined task force was in a position to act.^
4
See, for example, Fisher, ojd. cit
. , p. 633.
The newspaper accounts of the last days before the
Sinai war are impressive for their lack of indication that
anything va :ot. Less and less space was being devoted
to the Middle East during the last week of October as the






The Israeli Defense Ministry, during the summer of
1956 9 was faced with a growing concern over the deterioration
of the delicate balance of power in the Middle East following
the arms deals • During the atuaroar the Arabs had engineered
a united military front aimed at the destruction of Israeli
The lid placed on the Middle East arms race by the 1950 Tr:
Partite Declaration ''' had lost all .ce after th<? arms
purchases of sober, . , and the military aJ - tce of the
following summer constituted a major change in the land
order of battle against Israel* In troubled Jordan, telling
Israeli border attacks against the feday/- d there were
tak heir toll of Arab prestige and although Great Britain
affirmed 1 Mention of fulfilling her commitmenta to Jordan
if that matter became more serious, the anomalies of the
situation were extreme, (The question durinr summer
was whether the British, already at swords points with Egy-
over Suez, would fight Israel on behalf of Jordan if requested.)
In a c.! political victory in Jordan in October,
the pro-Nasser nationalist Sul&y^an Nabulsi took office and
''Syria and Saudi Arabia concluded a tary
j
with
Egypt putting their armies under joint command. See Campbell,
o£« ci&., pp. 91-95,
'By Great Britain, France and t.he United States to
monitor the arm; 1 sides to insure fcjr4
See Lencaowski, 0, . j„, p. 352. This arran.-. t was claimed
as the ' ;legai : ' juat re An, . . in
NOVembe-
Sc-v n, op 9 clt »| p. 57Iff. for the gravity with









immediately offered the Jordanian Army to the Arab alliance.
Having lost all faith in the truce keeping machinery
of the United Nations and dubious of the actual value of the
original armistice agreements in light of their repeated
violation (and counter-violation), plans for preventive war
had been made, in Israel during the summer and finalised
shortly after the Nabulsi victory.^' The objectives of the
Israeli operation were to be three-fold.
One objective was to be the destruction of the fedayeen
bases in the Gaza. .Strip, A second was the occupation of as
much of the Sinai peninsula as possible, to hold as a bar-
gaining counter in subsequent dealings with Egypt. The pit
ners realised full well that the Israeli Army lacked the
wherewithal! to hold Sinai permanently but they were apparently
interested in forcing the hand of the United Nations and were
willing to settle for demilitarization of Sinai as a victory
if the campaign were successful. World interest in the Israeli
cause had eroded during the progress of the Cold War and a re-
focussing of this interest on the complicated new developments
was felt to be in order.
Finally, the opening of the Gulf of Aqaba was a burning
issue in Israel. In addition to holding Gaza, Rafa and Abu
Ageila, the original plan aimed at holding the narrow strip
of territory which extended from Eilat down the western shore
9 /
See Robert Henrique®, 100 Hours to Suez (New York:











of the Gulf to and., ding Ras Nasrani, Sharm el-Sheikh
and the island of -X the blockade of the Gulf of
Aqaba could be permanently r> .• It is now an open
secret that original objectives tiered overly
ami iS by the military end by the civ-. political
leaders who were prlwy to the »*»
The I Army jumped off on Konci >b#r 29,
exercising her "inherent right of self-defence'*
i Nations Charter.^ The Soviet Union was absorbed
with huge troubles in Warsaw and in Budapest, The United
Sta. as entering the final throes of an election.^ The
French and British support units were in place according to
plan tad after the Eden-Mcllet ultimatum twenty-four hours
later, the operation looked as if it were succeeding brilliantly.
All political and military thrusts seemed to d 11 nicely
and smoothly.
anee, The Sinai Cf £ 1956 (Hew
Tork: Praeger, 1959), p. 79.
Statement made by Abba Eban, Israeli Re. *tive
to t'aa United Ma tic:,
, on . )V« mr 1, ] the | rk
Times, Nov
. 2, 1956,
ew Tgrk Times had a field day. Often, during
the wee.1 \,eaa oiT^aTi' the*" news that was f i
printed he news that fitted,
13
On the subject of French -British-Israeli collusion,
there has been much written. Eden (o£. cit., p. 572) states
that the possibilities of the Israeli" had been discussed
in mid~0. • but no actual formal collusion had occurred.
..
S3
The first or northern prong of the Israeli attack
enter . ^he strip by the end of the week, *
A second central p l westward through Sinai toward
the Canal and after the British and French paratroop attacks
haa secured much of the Canal zone the general collapse of
the Egyptian Array was .immanent, J
But the most Ifleant and abiding advant »Jf the
entire campaign was beir .-omplished in southern Sinai
the sweep of the '*Eastern Task Force" whose mission it was
to open the Gulf of Aqaba. The problem was largely one of
Beal, on the other hand, treats the collusion as a proven
fact (&£. ci_t., pp, 277-279) and the collusion angle is the
entire thesis of the Bromberger book, cited above. While
fascinating in itself, the point has only tengential rele-
vance to the Aqaba issue, But it would seem to be well
established that the British, French and Israeli actions
were taken as if there had been prior arrangement between
them.
This, admittedly, is an oversimplification,
Each author "numbers' 5 the prongs differently, and there
were actually four separate operations rather than three,
The numbering here is for simplicity sake and orders the
attacks g*C . hically,
15^Interestingly enough, these two campaigns were
the only ones to receive press coverage until November 6th,
for reasons that will become clear below, and. the coverage
in both the London and Newj York Times is quite unsatisfact-
ory. The communiques issued by theTsraeli and Egyptian
Army commands during the battles are worthless*

geography rather than strategy - «i«re were no roads to
speak of leading from Eiiat to I only a
*track"
through crags and mountain® which paralleled the western
shore, 16 and the entire operation had to be conducted
in
secrecy while the northern and central attacks were
reced-





i before dawn on Thursday November 1, 1956,
the Nin :try Brigade^ departed from luntilla and
arrived at 8*i sl-Naqb, the roadhead on the Egyptian-Israeli
border tim miles nc. j feet of Eiiat, that same afternoon, 19
The Ninth Brigade had tern *obiJ.ised on October 26
and was a
reserve group composed of artisans, farmers and a
sprinkling
16
O f Bai3ance 9 loc, cit»
17
Most of its inaccurate.
I
~In the Israeli Array, a "-Brigade" is equal t© an
American regiment*
..hat follows here is an account which has been
synthesized from five principal sources: the communiques
of the Israeli Defense Ministry as published in the New
York Times 3 November l,throtK $6} S.L.A,
5Inai"TTctory (New York: I Eorrow, 195^) I CBallance,
Tfie^glaar~?ampaign of 1956 > clt « aujpra; I ... op* fit >
:
and the* pe' nal recollections of the" Assistant Mill
Attache of the Government of Israel, who unwilling to be
quoted by name* had access to information bearing directly
on the problem of research and who provided Ion
for many el judgements made Mre« See al* . p»
cit», pp. 6OO-620 j Brombergers j ^£* cit«» passim and Calvocoressl




of white-collar worker® fro® the northern part of the country,
The commanding officer, Colonel Avr&ham Yoffe, was one of the
beet troop commanders of the Israeli Army* On the day of
mobilization, arrangements had been made to haul five LCMs
from Haifa to Eilat for use in the operation and after being
hauled to Beeraheba on flat-cars, these landing craft were
placed on phosphate trucks, carted to Eilat, and floated on
the afternoon of Monday, October 29 > the day the campaign in
the north had started- The LCMs were an important element
of a plan which envisioned a march down the western side of
the Gulf
,
periodic off-shore replenishment from the "Mike"
boats, conquest of the Egyptian installations at the Straits
(if possible after a union with the Central Airborne force
proceeding southward from Mitla pass) and an amphibious
assult on Tlran and Sanifir,
Arriving at Ras el-Baqb^O the force regrouped and
rested for the march southward and at 5:00 A.M. Friday 3
November 2, it jommenced the first phase of its advance, a
hard hilly run of almost one hundred road miles, The group
reached the top of the watershed at 2:00 kM* the following
morning and the oasis of Sin el«Furtuga two hours later* It
was now Saturday, November 3«
Thar* is a track from this oasis down to the shore
of the Gulf und arrangements had been made for the first
B 3 be confused with Ras el-Nabq (sometimes Nabk,




-' pu I • .>
#6
r@plenishm.ent® ft»a the LCMs to be roade *1 .i where
S track reached the to at a deserted fishing villas t
Nuwelba* The 220 vehicle* were i, . Travelling





though considerable hauling and pm g haci j , . a
in sorie cage©, engineers had been requ assages
through the crags to manage it.
After replenishing gast . and water tt% as,
the column pushed south toward the next l ;voua
at Bahab the following afternoon, 3 iderably
tougher south ol Sin el-Furtuga where the t: uphill
between large boulders which allowed, in i tight spot.-,
only a few inches clearance betw@~ a rocky walls and the
vehicle* themselves. Each single wheeled vehia be
manually pushed and pul'.. I :p to the top of the watershed
which was reached, after a night of effort, with only eight
vehicular 1\ • op of t> , :
trail led down toward Dahab and at this point Ic. ad to
cope with an unaxpee- -gisties prob.'. - -ago
in his | ine supply after the exhorbitant t is
vehicle:- - the rough night travel. He sleeted to remain
at the h: hi , oing b«u- ,'he
LCMs :• Vie Dehab tranefi , he






Meanwhile, the first element of the convoy had
come down from the highlands and engaged the first Egyptians
which they had seen during the "war. ,? As it pushed down
into Dahab at around 2\ 00 P.M. on Saturday, 3 November,
this first element was ambushed by an Egyptian Frontier
Force and three Israelis were killed and six wounded before
the squad of Egyptians withdrew southward on camels toward
Nakeb. 21
Vfhile the skirmish did not seriously affect the
fighting capability of the Brigade, it was the first taste
of blood and it took the edge of pleasure off the arrival of
the LCMs shortly after four. The LCKs were able at this
point to off-load two French AMX tanks which now took their
place in the column for the drive to Nakeb 32 miles south
and the force moved out at 7 '00 P.M. that evening after a
brief rest. South of Dahab, some of the roughest terrain
yet encountered took the group through the Ashira Divide
21
This encounter is difficult to establish definitely
as to time and place, Henrlques fails to mention it at all.
General Marshall describes an encounter at Dahab at about the
same time of the Banc day but his details sound suspiciously
like the skirmish O'Ballance places at Nakeb the following
afternoon, (See infra.) To add to the confusion, Henriques













which although blocked for at least a mil© by boulders,
was cleared ifi the dark by the sapper company working with
the infantry troops.
By i Sunday, November 4, the line approached
Nakeb through a small pass cut in the bleak terrain by the
Wadi Kaid. Here it was ambushed by another 1 patrol,
which had managed to blow some boulders across the track
down the wadi bed. The patrol harassed the column briefly
but no damage was done and no casualties incurred. 23
Nakeb had been a listening and watching post forming
part of the Blockade complex and had been apparently evacuated
Saturday afternoon. The camel patrol had been left to delay
the line of march which, undelayed, now faced a relatively
easy run down five miles of flat beach to R -.rani, the
linch-pin in the Egyptian installation.
After contacting the LCMs again, the first element
hit this road for the run south. Meanwhile, the Israeli
Air Force began working on Ras Nasrani with napalm and as
they headed south, the infantry and armor spotted the B-17
and the P~51s which were softening up what was expected to
°3
'"'This incident is placed by General Marshall at 2
A.M. Sunday morning followed by an incident in a radio conver-
sation between Yoffe and General Koishe Day&n which Henrique
s
places more nearly in the time context mentioned here.
Henriques mentions this incident as the first of the actual
enemy contacts but consistent with the rate of march t
other internal evidence, the account he 8 unquestion-
ably correct and follows the account given by O'Ballance.
Additionally, the earlier encounter in which casualties did
occur as described here is placed by the majority at Dahab.

#9
be th© main redoubt in the south, the fortress of Ras Nasrani,
The Egyptian Defense of the £ trait
Ras Nasrani Is a mall headland which, following
the Egyptian decision to blockade- the Gulf, had been well
.tifiea. The defences were strong and constructed in accor-
dance with the usual Egyptian desert fortification plan. In
iition, concrete breastworks ha, « laid up and the
complex entanglei.; in effective barbed wire defenses. It
mounted two 6 inch and four 3 inch coastal g et in
concrete pointing seaward covering the Enterprise passage
bee the mainland and Tiran, sitting at the other side
of the channel two miles to the east. The passage itself,
eight hundred yards wide, made an excellent target for the
guns and coral reefs and shoals accounted for the remainder
of waterspace between the two land masses. Tiran itself
was not fortified, nor was Sanifir, although temporary in-
stallations on Tiran had been used from tine to time during
the Blockade.
Base defense of the installation was provided for
by mach- tents laid cut in a semi- circular





ail with overhead cover ^ii-d.. . &•*
field. 25
The base commander tfaa a senior dgypti gular
Army Colonel who c iirectiy he
General Headquarters in Cairo. Gs
,
'ember
word ha.' meeived that a "reconnaissance . ,h~
merit co:.i3isti it several %i .ahixiea 7, wau <g
south be at the installation within the m
§iac days . tctinj rospc... .1 he ana h._s field
ec; . . be the
best sir base:. the information .ad
d thi . position \ end and
when the Ninth ] ,.ie charred up tc
for an all i > incredibly tho n was
completely abandoned. Feguib bad ordereo. the position
evacuate:! completely and he had instead, entrenched his
force at Charm el-Sheikh) a fan riles to the south, where he
decided uo mak-: his stand. There he was supplied with 2
cubic me. vf fresh water, a purification plant sufficient
to sustain his trcops with purified sea-water indefinitely
and food for several months, including 50C live sheep. He
had sent. . i sick and weak back to Egyr pre-
vious week and had a total of 150C nen a:id 43 officers with
95
<'0ms batalion, firmly committed to the defense of
this position, might have withstood a division attack, so
artillery resistant were its works. 1 ' liarshall, od_, cit .
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which to stage his d e«
Much criticise, has been heaped on Colonel Naguib (no
relation to the more famous Naguib or Neguib of the same name)
for deserting such a defense position at Ras Nasrani to make
a stand at Sharm el«Sheikh. The criticism is from the Israeli
side, generally, and seems usually to be based on an over-
emphasis of the hardware at Ras Nasrani. kftzr his capture,
for example, Neguib expressed the point that he had made his
decision based on the principle of concentration—that he
felt it would be better to defend from a single concentrated
position than from two widely separated points, While
generally belittled as a narrow approach to the problem
and while certainly in contrast to the Israeli philosophy of
calculated military boldness, such a stand had the additional
merit of placing his force where there was both a deep water
qua! and a usable air strip * No such facilities existed at
Ras Nasrani • This would have ruled out supplying or evacuating
large numbers by sea or air, or at least by sea assuming a
state of real seige,
B:'
,
Ras Nasrani, however, Neguib had seen
26
to it that the heavy coastal guns had been spiked. It is
26 Israel, of course, claims credit for this, See,
for example, Eytan, loc* cit » While they undoubtedly caused
it to be done, it waa ""actually accomplished on Saturday ei












submitted that any crit '. of Neguib from an impartial
critic must center around this action more than any oth*r«
The guns were the rail • etre for the defensive installa-
tion in the first place and the political implications of
the spiking of the guns titan to be the most valid focus of
any criticism ©f Neguib«
The Final Assault
Quickly moving past the defensive fortifications,
the Ninth Brigade arrived at the outer dsfensec of ohr.
el-Sheikh at afternoon Sunday, November 4» and pro-
ceeded to ovar~run these perimeter defense posts.. The main
body concentrated and refueled and while there was spasmodic
firing all that afternoon, most of the force got some rest
and refreshment. The temperature was &2 degrees and there
was a good ,e blowing off the sea* The LCMs arrived in
the afte , unloaded two more AMX tanks from Eilat and in
conjunction with a P-51 strike on Tiran, landed a small
party on the island which found it deserted,
Encamped before Sharm el-Sheikh, the Brigade was now
the last Israeli unit still in action agair j?t > ?~e
operations in the north were over and the Airborne Brigade
which had . fc through Mat la pass was at thc^ - t hurry-
ing around the wee, Ip of Sinai : expect
pine
-3 r c The Air Force, i , f£L









The del was a wide WW Yoff •




ft at dayl ;» At 3 '30 A.M., there-
fore, C " )Jf &Tf
docking from
: Egyp ; ' V* att< - reat fc|M I their lines.
In th' : , U. •
eastern fl ise, only to fir deserted,
They and hauJ
thesri tack to tfeftlr own lines.
... dawn a classic infantry charge began, wavered,
and bad t in the fai withering f: ;
from the Egyptians. At 7^00 A.K, Yoffe called for and re-
ceived a ni" jwn over the trenches fr»at a Kystere jet.
The beginning of the and of the physical blockade of fcl
Gulf of Aqi ing of Nov
5> , when this napal- .ded* By 3:30 the wi"
was broken we ft the Egyptian Comauander surrendered.
He .
.
| . .00 men, fought well and lost honestly*
Aftei pturs, ,'i' tg for
hi® defeat, fhe «0rals :ered Isy
air att.
i
' eh he had only '^spor r
I I
94
Willi il til had no ar
support k of | &!
'
would have been difficu"
to imagine any ..- .;ywhere other than from within
his own Li: . i
Finally, he *d th. had been no
Th: - at i when it was all said and done, was
unfortunate. A; -is gr. and has
used it t<: .• , . i-an def I as« effort but
in balance, it -^r that he had been C
and out imagined by a group of we- . a .:_-:• a who simply
had more, to fight for.
After:
As long as the Isr - array held their position in
south' ii» the Egyptian bloei I the Gulf of Aqaba.
was ended. It . almc-ot immediately ar. it howevr
that continued tj occupation of the Gtra.it MS er
pract. : p (to say nothing of the X . t)
and the I if the struggle D i .;.If of A icrw shifted
dramatically to New York v?here for the first tv a history,
it be<- Q« of the momer. iuea of the day.
woo s waaafcting military victory «nd did
not want; to be d rad of the political fruits of that










1 * ' ' - 1 itl
'' • : fo
••v:
managed to ac : - • > institution of
viol-- ision
.ly encamped deep in
Egypt and i
fch* f •,
pecte<t to forego these -^©s and return t
anything rei •; the same
which »• . i attack*, the Rhodes Armistiee
had b> ' ,es
tlea
Ben G with full moral force - ng
deter;;'..'.nation 1
' presented a seven point eta the
world mm . ' oy:
ice agreement with Egypt is dead
and cannot be re. i to life.
2* • the armistice lines between
Egypt have no more validity,
3. Hi vd dispute- whatever between the
Israel and the %&YP
4. We do not wish our rei to
Lnmt in the present anarchic e and
we are ready to ente .'or
a a peace, cooperate
that
they are direct negotiations wither X
:.m on either si under
durress from any quarter whatever*
5. V| hope that all peace~l<. nations wil
&rt our desir-.- tiona
with each of the Arab itatts, but si if they
are unprepared for s permanent peace, so 1c








; 9*13 , t«rrltoi) . of the
area oc
7» I .cht agocins'" Arab country
- agal 27
This was at .loar position,
re.- . >nal | ' r, 1956, were
eoiaething ela* . bmb th> >na were unable
to n the Jews, tfe* ate
question emerged i kind of a de fac t," iteration in
the power structure rega- I awal
from Sinai j 1 and
3 h& inter-domesti"
the dif": -existence between Jew and Arab were
all but hop ;,at first week of November ar
delicate etateemanefeip would hare been reqtU
had been t*\ ' ing the at.
New Tork. Two otr tuations bore directly on the center
however j follow. . ar of "volunteer" interven-
27
State,
Polic Kiddle East , *7 l95Y>









q to clear the .
aft »•
day b tho a>
At M fefct United Nations the
previous a plan for the establish
of • For- ©en approved by the
General A*i e and with the leverage
gained by b .suggestion to replace the rapidly
degenerc 3 of
,
yase fire wae agreed to by all :. based
les of the nilitary 1 iorL on the ax tern
of 1 The folio-, Las
and Canadian members of the first United Nai cy
Force were re) . their way to Egyp
There had been a suddenness on the part of Ben Qari




amber 6, >c ,e corapl.
of the cablegr ""SITepilov to the I
.urity Counc iber 5» in Department of St
ft cit. . , p. 17#ff. enters as United
eument S/3736,
mes a November 4, 1956.
ibl read, ?r . in* 5
November all fig . a.nd I







*bore 3 I aft*
Issuing it* 31
Tfaers seems i ... - ;r»
tended forces near Suez were the lee :1
concerns muA that hiss primary &1 i was focue ,n the
•Sham el Ga&a, al react :ight
hare been based or . t of the efti the
ceti fi . g power or again, the ft] to
"foreign ave a| .... iy
she direct unilateral tteral a :-f th-
Union or the Unite- The previous day his own troops
had pillafc' 1 & all but destroyed the Turc
.
Gaza ftnd harsh protests wars all that he had received fr
that escapade .** It would be one thing to allow the
Egyptians ti m©¥e ba *?ould ftlfcft another
to let them back into Gaaa. But in retrospect it would seem
that the pa ;nsideration was for the Sharm el-Sheikh
and the ability of wnoevr upied it to keep the Strait
cf Tiran open* He fctood tort to gain, therefore, by
resisting the Bte iti&lly and progrr
Ms I in return for
than by -uiescence to a force which m fc yet








There was the psychological consideration, of cour-
in that the seven points were delivered to a Knesset wildly
intoxicated with victory but there can be no doubt that the
letter of President Eisenhower dated November 7th was the
occasion, if not the cause, for Ben Gurion's change of heart.
In this letter, the President ''viewed [the reports that Israel
33did not intend to withdraw from Sinai J with deep concern. *"
Almost immediately, . Golda Meir, the Israeli Foreign
Minister, "had the honor ... to inform* the Secretary
General of the United Nations the following day
that the government of Israel will willingly with-
draw its forces from Egypt immediately upon the
conclus; satisfactory arrangements with the
United Nations in connection with the emergency
international force. 34
In a face saving reply to Eisenhower, therefore,
claiming a j in transmission on "owning to a breakdown
in coiiiiunications between the Department of State and the
United Stac Tel Aviv," Ben Gurion himself
reiterated this new after taking care to impress the
president with the spontaneity of the change. 3
5
33\,*hite House News Release, November 8« 1956, quoted
verbatim in Department of State, oj>. cit . , pp. 211-212.
ii
Department of State, op* cit.
, pp. 212-213* recorded
as A/3320.
ThB. London Daily Telegraph of November 10, 1956
(page 2) carr t that "evidence is accumulating that
Britain, American and possibly France warned Israel that she












It soon developed that the withdrawal was to be
somewhat less than whole hearted. On Monday, November
19th, Dag Hammerskjold had requested the status of the with*
drawal from the British, French and Israeli representatives
in view -jhat the "arrangements" for the United.
Nation* Force were thoroughly in operation. Both the
western powers hedged en the grounds of Egyptian violation
of the cease fire and Israel reported that :es had
h&mi withdrawn "for varying distances along the Egypt:
front »" but that it was awaiting "satisfactory arrangements
• * * such as will insure Israel's security ftj ! the
treat or danger of attack and against acts of beligerency
by land or g»a«,Tt3" By December 22, the Anglo-French with-
drawal was | i.ste and only the Israeli forces remained
in Egypt, along the Sharm and in Gaza.
Tfee Diplomatic Order of Battle
In effect, the Gulf of Aqaba was opened on the
morning of Monday, November 5th but it was not the kind of
opening that either faction could be expected to live with.
It was certainly distasteful to the United Nations.
withdra acted a second hand, source quoting Ambassador
Larson t effect that Israel was running the risk of
forfeiting dollar aid in her intransigence. Such a sitt.
tion is not unreasonable to assm
t of the Secretary General, November 21, with







It was, moreover, an uneasy military de facto situa-
tion, perilous to maintain without diplomatic and political
foundation * On the one hand, the United Nations was promis-
ing its protection for the freedom of access to the Straits
of Tiran provided Israel withdrew the forces she felt vital
to the situation she wished to maintain. Israel felt that
little by little the gains achieved in November were slipping
through her fingers and on the Aqaba question, she decided
to make a stand. The United Nations had theoretically also
guaranteed her borders during the preceding seven years, and
she knew from personal experience how easily these borders
had been violated in both directions, Meanwhile, Nasser,
through the diplomatic backup he was getting from Russia,
was already beginning to emerge as the apparent victor
*
On the other hand, a withdrawal of Israeli forces
from Suez and a negotiable position in Gaza would leave him
with a fight in which his means were more equal to his oppo-
sition,, Instead of three weak stands in the face of an
aroused world opinion, he would be able to concentrate his
political and diplomatic strength on the one single stand
in the Straits and as 1957 began, Ben Gurion began to act ae
if this were his main plan, In order to emerge with the
single victory of freedom of access to the Gulf, therefore,
three things would be necessary s
The first, of course, would be Israeli possession of






demilitarization of the area under a truly effective inter7-
national administration which would be in a position to
sanction its protection with armed force and political
strength. It must be remembered that in the period under
discussion, the concept of an effective United Nations
Emergency Force was wholly new, the only precedent being
General Burns' wobbly Truce Supervision Organization of the
early fifties which drew little respect from either principal,
The second requirement was a strong, carefully worked
out political position based on the unanimous support of the
major powers » This position, it is submitted, was necessarily
conceived of as being independent of the self-interest of
the supporting states narrowly conceived. What Ben Gurion
probably had in mind was a support which would be given to
the freedom of passage through the Straits of Tiran and not
support given to Israel simply out of national interest. The
support, he wanted would have to be given in the name of inter-
national law or some such other universal principle which
would be independent of an Arab-Jewish policy, For this, he
would have to nwork" on the United States since both he and
Mrs, Meir were becoming increasingly aware of the fact that
the Israeli-American honeymoon of the Truman administration
and. the early, quieter Eisenhower years was all but over in
the wake of the 1956 election and the Suez Crisis. There
was the increasing shadow of Soviet interest in the Kiddle
East to consider and its effect on an American Middle East
erf '
»C










policy was net to be taken lightly. If the United States
found itself in a position of support for freedom of access
to the Gulf because it was supporting Israel, it would be a
weak, unrealistic position which could not possibly hope to
correspond to the broader issues at stake. Ben Gurion and
Mrs. Meir were apparently realistic enough to realize that
the Cold War took precedence over everything else in American
foreign policy and a strictly Israeli policy in Washington
was out of the question, Dulles' disenchantment with Israel
was well known and a more withdrawn policy would make good
37
sense in Washington. Indications were that such a policy
was coming late in 1956 and that the Eisenhower Doctrine then
being formulated would be only one of a series of steps
calculated to present a new face to the Arab world on which
Israeli friendship would be nothing but a black eye.
Finally, Israeli planners realised that if Eilat
itself were ever to fulfill the role required of it, it would
necessarily have to be both politically and commercially
able to handle Persian Gulf crude. Quite possibly, this
problem was the most acute because it threw the situation
right back into the inter-domestic political conflict with
the Arab League. Politically, the solidarity of the League
37
Drummond and Coblentz, Duel At the Brink (New York:








presented a problem in that it required Israel to look to
Iran for any crude it- might attempt to move. The solidarity
of the League had been amply demonstrated in November when
Syrian sabotage had all but cut the throughput flow to the
Mediterranean, when Iraq choose her commitment to the Arab
Joint Defense Pact over that of the Baghdad Pact (despite
the fact that 6b% of her economy was in oil she could not
move) and when even the sheikhdoms exhibited hostility,
sabotage and strikes in sympathy with Nasser «3& Arabian
oil was obviously out of the question and with the Canal
blocked ? the Eilat-Seershsba pipeline was an inflammatory
issue in the Arab world* Commercially, the blacklist of
vessels and firms doing business with Israel was an important
factor to consider. Even if she could arrange it, any ship
which carried Iranian oil to Eilat and any company which
moved it would face severe economic retaliation unless
suitable arrangements could be made to defy the blockade and
the black-list profitably and continue the defiance.
The pipeline wa3 begun in January, 1957 » its success
contingent on three factors:
1. Strong political support from the Great Powers
for continued access to the Gulf with or without United
Nations Forces , but in any case without Egyptian or Saudi
interference.
36
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2* Passage of I -ast one flag vessel from as
many of the ttaj«r naritia* p i as could be arranged,
preferably carryir- j establish a precedent of un-
vested passage.
3- Machinery of some kind on an international
scale %Q procure at lea' . eriean support for the venture
and to engage a ship, cargo and crew which would undertake
both t;he commercial and physical risks of such a voyage in
the glare cf the publicity which would be an essential ele-
ment m operation,
a would be prepared to pay the price of a complete
withdrawal f: . .m el-. h if the plan could be success-
fully carried off and woul quiasce in assisting the new
American Kiddl; it policy by staying out of the American-
Soviet context if she could open the Gulf*






With the arrangement of the Cease Fire in Sin
vast changes had takaa place in the power structure in the
Middle East and U. ulitle« of the new situation were
important, The Israeli forces were deep in the heart of
Egypt, Gaza was la the hands of the Jews and on the Strait
of Tiran, the Ninth Brigade controlled access to the Gulf
of Aqaba to insure freedom of passage to any and all ships. -*-
The United States and the Soviet Union, occupied
with other problems and acting in far less concert than is
usually remembered, had succeeded in interjecting sufficient
pressure from outside the immediate crisis area to separate
the antagonists, The key question of freedom of passe
through th 11 Canal was at least temporarily overshadow
by the presence in the Canal of scuttled, ships and barges
which had to be removed immediately, All sides had promised
to withdraw after some preliminary diplomatic skirmishir
which had involved the Prime Ministers of Bun<iH, Ceylon,
Indonesia and India who formulated a strong communique on
^Would Israeli forces have prevented the passage of
an Egyptian merchant ship through the Gulf carrying arms for
Jordan? An interest question which was never brought, up,






the subject on November 14 an' ;h ha. followe
,
the ne.xt week, by a similar en—ruiriiqi from the
Conference of Nine Arab States held at Beirut,
^
As noted above, Ben to have looked upon
the Sinai occupation and the resolutions calling for his
withdrawal* -' M not one but three separate prob
Sue?- forces were of only insignificant importance to Israeli
security and wer be th to come back home,
withdrawal graciously made in for favorable publicit
The Gaza problem was somewhat more vital to the defense of
the country jfl withdrawal from the Strip
would have t< --accessi'iil bar for as much
international peace-keeping machinery as could be obtained.
But Gaza was .' than critical; in the changed military
context even a return to the status cuo would have been
tolerable altho Lt worried Israel considerably.
On the Strait of Tiran, the problem w ate. The
Gulf was significant and as the diplomacy of the middle weeks
of November unfolded, it seemed that Israel was content to
^Departmer, State, og. cit,, ffl, 217 ff.
^Itxd,, pp, 220-222,
•
'Resolutions 997, ttM ssiOA of November 2,
1956, and 1002 of I oer 7th, 1 ( , verbatim in Bloc Id,
op . cit
,
, op. 1#4 ff. The first Resolution had been spon-
sored by the United States and. carried 64 to 5. The second,
submitted by the neutrals, was merely a repeat of the provi-
sions of the first. -ining Resolutions (99$, 9,"
1000 and 1001} all refer to til* situation and the OT5F. See












play a waiting gar
pressures bre to bear. of these M on
the 24th, when th- -:.rai Al , withOL ;.nce to
committee, pft8«#4 a resoluti 1 1 call for with~
drawal, Over the ta&d of 24th, Be fifth
1 cabinet 6 and when the . ml Assembly : i its
United Nations Emergency Force Resolution "onday, Noveml
26th, the withdrawals beg.: some earnest,'
The month of January was a month of virtual deadlock,
during which three rather clearly defined positions could I
identified, Israel continued to hoi-:;, out for positive
assurances that she would gain more than she would lose by
withdrawing, the gain beinc, related to relative security in
Gaza and absolute security on the Gulf of Aqaba a The Secx
tary General, caught in the middle, was wor furiously
toward achi MMftpllaziec with th$ withdrawal resolutions
on the one hand tH , the withdrawal and substitution
by the United States Emergency a manner as
build more security than was destroyed on the other,
pt, at the e . te pole, was content to play th© role of
innocent and pat . creditor carefully making m i ic
"London Times, November 27,
'Coincide- th and intert. ; the negotiations
was another Israeli diplomat '--vy, asking the UN to assist
Israel in communicating with >t* It may well hav 1 a
lever to cover furth .Lays, . ~s of the










commitments either way is IB effort to take advantage of a
situation v- - Ly embarrass:
to her enemy,
It was at this : that the United States entered
the lists in earnest,
The United States and trie Gulf of Aqaba
In an aide memoire handea to Ambassador Sban on the
11th of February, Secretary Dulles reviewed the situation
as It had pr stxv.cr- the ceaso fire, Or the Gaza
matter, he assured Israel that he understood its position
and struck, a he a. In the first part of the document,
Dulles went on record in favor of prompt and unconc il
withdrawal from Gaaa ture of the Gaza Strip
to be worked out through the efforts and good offices of the
United Nations," Ben durion. waa undoubtedly willing to do
this, for a price,
second part of the document, he repeated the
stand taken publicly so many times La the past that fcfaa Gulf
was an ii atj.oua'; waterway and quoted at lei .-.'rom the
Egyptian aide jry 2$, 1950,° on the subject
'Full text in Department of State, *J>, cit,, p.
Naturally the text was not released immediately but was held
until February 17 when it was released as Department of State
Press Rele '2 of that date* In his March 5th conference,
Secretary Dulles, was qi; ned at length on this note, See





of free passs. tactics
anO the recognla< pXm* c law of nations, n






"TtTTs oT ' - that EKe enjoyment of the
right of free and innor by Israel would
da withdraw.' I accc with
United. Hat Re sol; i„ , . , The U
Stat, i prepared put; ' to declare tha I will
use its irifl , 't with other fife
Nations m 3, to the end that following Israel >s
thdrawal, these other measures Will "oV
aienEed, TEerphasis added*
)
Israel was now in a position to claim - Lid American
«uppoi-: ,.,- r a w11 .••!! Troja Qaaa i
Chara tically, Ben Gurion was not about t m the
that American influence had :,© do with
a change of h art, althoi ;is at itted
American prestige with the Arabs in the as much as
it saved Israeli t, Vfhmn President Eisenhower
the nation on the ev jfaferuaj } 1957, he reco-
some of the problems of the previous mont • u info? he
American people or., hi mr Aqs^a, He Mil able to
.«« Is.r on "Tina g ^s, t;
and in a question summ< ; • piu
States,




tory in the .face of Unites Hati«u lapproval












This was made to maintain tl. • on
that whatever •< :ms to be : was to be a
victory of , In th
regard, it aJ | .; fee express
lie di America:; J on the
same "high r principle a d the
mment at 3 he
President's I ' , " F virtue scorned,
aeea; what he actual! :1 was that
Israel aw be : pat Gaza . fpoa t3
I United Nations would a Kii price** He
already ha loan guarantee of sup in hi I
By the 25th, Abbs. Scan was ready to talk business
with Hammerakjcld on the Gulf of Aqaba, Three t: were
both* Scan, In h it® conversat b Hamraerskjold,
which would have to be resolved before his troops would leave.
Would the Ball Lens Erne- f Force be specifically
instr - '. strait- an? Hamme- replied
that It woulc tfett&d the removal of the United I is
Emergency For subject to the concurrence of the entire













on a United Ration* Naval Forcv In % &lf at the
Strait e.e and lam • a. „' This, Hamtaer-
skjold replied, lamld b :nd t L of t
-
Secretary Gem
6 fact that Eban and I rskjold talk.
in thl proof posi ad hit his mark
with his Febru-. » The ritual ;
of the two head* of government w*-- -;eful in si
irr i diplor. ; scene t.© erabell. I I
men '. ch were sha;
(
: -iint ft >f antagonism
as %hi enhower Doctrine wt . ne Arab
world, Israel was gain ast. All
that was require r now wa ibey .ns
callin.;/, for w
I md h£. . . er tL \Qr%%$ to the
United Nations Commander.
The Arabs wu le were ha dlar experiences*
A fi*< held iat la February between the 4]
Heads of State at 1" >«fa Pa~- Ln Cairo,*-'1 K iad
recently returnta from a v., | to the United States and
Hussein, Kuwatly and Nasser were on hand to so (fct
reactior had m nd re >n hie The report
sounded considerably more en Li -ually was
It id,, p , . 321, recor. is UN Document A/3563
of February TiB, 1957.
13New Yor











and a serious split seems to have developed at this meeting
as to what the next Arab diplomatic move would be,
Nasser had been forced through a soul search! .-
similar to the one which the past three months had forced
on Ben Gurion. Just as there were three aspects to the
Israeli problem, there were similarly three problems for
Egypt and some kind of a priority of value had to be estab-
lised to determine which plum could be lost first. The
blockade of the Straits of Tiran looked like a losin; propo-
sition to Egypt in February, 1957. American opposition to
the "tri-partite invasion" in October had certainly not raaae
an Eisenaower Republican out of Nasser but American influence
was at least to be respected for its consistent stana against
the action, tfhiie this respect was all but neutraliz
within a month when the United States agreed, at Bermuda, to
join the military committee of the Baghdad Pact, there was
still enough of it around in February to have had some
effect on the conference. A controversy developed, probably,
as to how serious the Americans were and a decision seems
to have been reached to settle for no decision at that time
other than a reaffirmation of the old territorial waters
position and a renewed affirmation of Arab sovereignty over
the Gulf.
In the second matter, that of Gaza, the Arabs had a
stronger political case dating back to the Rhodes afreement












Gaza and the American position that the agreements should
be implemented across the board, they were willing to accept
the United Nations as what would amount to a return to the
status quo
,
The game they could not afford to lose was the Suez
Canal, On this point they were ready to stand or fall and
ultimately j they were successful. It is interesting to note
how the three Arab problems were inversely proportional to
the Israeli problems ^ and how, although the meeting ended
with absolutely no agr> on how to solve any of them,
they all agreed that there were problems which required a
certain priority of settlement. The communique they issued
listed "decisions* reached, but the decisions were nothi
more than a catalogue of these same problems, ^
By March 1st, real progress had been made* Dulles
met with the ambassadors from the Arab countries in Washing-
ton on that date and reported to them the intention of the
Israeli government to withdraw from Sinai, Almost at the
same moment, Mrs, Keir, in the United States for an explora-
tory visit, made a similar statement to the United Nations
^In a direct report from Cairo on March 21, Michael
Adams viewed the same three problems but from a different
aspect, "Suez," he wrote, "seems the most immediately solu-
able, Gaza the most dangerously urgent, and the Gulf cf Aqaba
the hardest to solve," Manchest er Guardian, March 24, 1957*
^Department of State, op 4 cit,
,
p. 321,










General Assembly, ' There was an interesting disclaimer,
however, in the State Department Press Release referring to
the Dulles meeting with the ambassadors* It mentioned the
fact that Communist propaganda was spreading a story in the
Arab world to the effect that there "was a secret under-
standing between the United States and Israel* and deplored
this story as a misrepresentation of "what was, in effect,
a great achievement for the principles and efforts of the
United Nations," (In her New York speech, however, Mrs,
Melr made considerable capital of the American readiness to
exercise the right of freedom of passage.)
In the New York speech, Mrs, Meir laid out the
Israeli position on the "final" settlement of the Aqaba
issue. The Gulf was an international waterway, Israel
would do nothing to impede Arab maritime traffic, would
protect its own ships in the Gulf and would interpret an
attack on its vessels as entitling it to exercise its rights
of self defence under Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter.
Finally, she had "received with gratification the
assurances of leading maritime powers that they forsee a
normal and regular flow of traffic of all cargoes in the
Gulf of Aqaba."
The last Israeli forces left the Sharm el-Sheikh on













the afternoon of March S, 1957, to the plaudits of Ambassador
Lodge in the United Nations, ° and a somewhat glum silence
from the Arab states . The United Nations Emergency Force,
once again under General Burns, took the positions vacated
by the Israelis and the Gulf of Aqaba was open, finally*
Israel had gained and the Arab possession of Suez was
virtually irrevocable.




. » . JW/q did not bring
about Arab-Israeli peace or restore international control of
the canal. It is true that some successes were gained, The
military weaknesses of the Egyptian forces was exposed and
duly noted, in particular by her neighbors, This had im-
portant consequences. From the day of the Egyptian defeat
In the Sinai desert, the chances of a Nasser Empire were
scotched, not killed. Even so, the Sudan did not hesitate
to re si'.. - grasping demands which Nasser later made on
her northern territory. It is unlikely that Nasser or any
other Arab leader will undertake a war of extermination
against Israel in the immediate fut'jre, without outside
support. st this, Uasaer remains, ruler of Egypt,
his ambition still dangax-ous,
. . .
Our intervention at
least closed the chapter- of complacency about the situation
in the Middle East, It led to the Eisenhower Doctrine and
from that to An^lo-American intervention in the following
summer in Jordan and Lebanon, It helped show that the west
was not prepared to leave the area wide open for infiltra-
tion and subversion by others. But these were only partial
gains, The uneasy equipoise still continues.
"Happily, by a combination of brilliant courage and
firmness, Mr. Ben Gurion was able to secure for his country
one capital advantage, f: massage of the Gulf of Aqaba to
the port of Elath /sic/ which could transform the economy
of Israel and make everything that small country endured








In Gaza the situation remained critical as each side
jockeyed for position astride an imaginary Armistice Line,
In mid-March an important flare-up loped. General Burns
had set up his headquarters there when the Israelis withdrew
and on the 15th Egypt asserted a claim to exercise complete
authority over the liberated area. Neither the United
Nations Emergency Force nor the Egyptians seem to have
displayed much tact in the matter and for a day or two it
posed a serious threat between the United Nations and Egypt*
This would have wide implications because it seemed almost
possible at this juncture that the Eyptians might insist on
United Nations withdrawal in which ease the entire keg would
have blown sky high again. The situation calmed down after
a United Nations concession to Egypt, over the bitter pro-
tests of Israel.
In Suez, the original problem of usage and control
became significant once again after General Wheeler had
accomplished the initial clearing of the passage. On
February 19th, an interim plan providing for toll collection
by an international body but allowing full Egyptian opera-
tion was rejected by Egypt. The Egyptian answer, on March
19th, was an Egyptian Canal Authority which would respect
the 18$8 Convention but which would collect its own tells
and operate its own funds. Since there seemed to be no
Hew York Times , March 21-29, 19i>7; Michael Adams,
Suez and After'p""p. "1477"
-< 1 «.
feasible alternative to this plan, the Suez Canal Users
Association, formea the previous summer, authorized its
members to begin using the waterway on the Egyptian terms
ana on May 13, the British lifted their ban and allowed
payment of tolls in sterling. The French followed a month
21later
.
The Voyage of the !Xern Hills "
plomacy in the Middle East durinr; the last week of
March and the first week of April, 1957, resembled nothin;
as much as a tangled web, beautiful and symmetrical from a
distance but difficult to unravel. The Canal was about to
open fully and American Ambassador to Egypt Raymond Hare
was conducting secret talks with the Egyptian foreign
minister daily. ese talks took on a new significance and
part of the mystery about them cleared up after the release
of Nasser* s Suez policy, but at the same time th tian
government modi fi 3d its stand in Gaza just barely enough to
allow full United Nations patrols in return for their con-
tinued ascendency there. kg Hammerskjold held extensive
talks with Mrs, Meir the previous week2 -* and had assured her
21iiuropa Publications, The Middle East 1961 (Lonuonj
Europa Ltd., 1961), p. 3 #7.
op
The London Times n almost daily reference to
these talks during the last week in March whereas the New
York Times carried only two small notices of their progress,
"buriea^ in the back page*. See the two newspapers for
March 26 and 29, but particularly April 4 and 6.






that he "believed there would be no interference" with
Israeli shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba. News was also leak-
out of a secret pact concluded by Mrs, Meir with the
French on her way home from Washington that weekend, ana
Hammerskjold was now complaining publicly of Israeli silence
concerning his contacts with Nasser which were now in
2L
pro ,
At the end of March, these talks were said to have
culminated in a "gentleman^ agreement" whereby Nasser
allegedly modified his intransigence on Aqaba and Gaza
enough to strike a bargain for concessions to Egyptian
sovereignty in the Canal. * By the following weekend, April
6th, President Eisenhower was cooly refusing to come to Ben
Gurion*s diplomatic I tance in the matter of Israeli
access to the Suez Canal, The impression can be gather
that the United States was unwilling to press Israeli access
to the Canal at a time when Hare was himself negotiate
in Cairo for a more basic arrangement dealing with every-
body^ access to X\ oal. Certainly the State Department
realized that Nasser was mak hat amounted to a conces-
sion in his own the mere presence of the Unit
Nations Emergency Force, particularly in southern Sinai a
2/fIbi_d., March ~6th.
25 Ib- ,, .arch ::8th.
pIbid., April 7, 1956, apparently datelined before
arrival of the " :Korn Hills" at iilat.
EMI
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the outstanding promissory note to exercise the right of
''free and innocent" passage through the Strait of Tiran was
not exactly adding to Dulles 1 peace of mini. Once the
right had been exercised, however, the 3 late would apparently
27be wiped clean. '
It was an important slate to wipe clean, this
American-Israeli "collaboration" (as the Arabs viewed it) as
the Eisenhower Doctrine"- was about to be put to the test
in Jordan and as the United States was making a new bia for
29influence in the Middle oast. 7 At a press conference on
March 5th, Dulles had been asked about his intentions in
the matter of exercis? a the American right of passare, and
the f©llc interchange was reported:
Q, You said . . . that the United Status expected
to exercise it3 right _of free and innocent passage
through this Strait /the Strait of Tiran/ into the
Gulf of Aqaba. Have you taken any steps or ao you
contemplate taking any steps to establish this
exercise of right on the part of the United States
— in other words, should a ship or ship3 normally
begin to move through there now? Have they al-
ready moved?
A. Well, there is no-prearranged exercise in that
respect. It would be normal that a ship of United
'•'The New YorK Telegram of March 19th reported a de-
cline in American prestige among the Arabs, the Jews and the
western powers. "Most objectionable is the refrain that
President Eisenhower has broken his pledge,"
'-^Which had been signed as Public Law 85-7 on March
9. See Department of State, op_. cit
. , p. 44.
^Ambassador 3 P. Richard* was touring th i .ale
East "to present and discuss /President Eisenhower* s/ pro-
posals," See his statement of Inarch 12, as he depa'r* , in
Department of State, cjp, cit




States registry would be going through the;?
You see, it is only quite recently that the
port of Elath /sic/ has bee 'eloped so that
it is a port which attracts shipping. Nov*
there has been a development at the port of
Elath to a point where there will probably be
considerable shipping going there in the normal
course of events that would include a vessel of
United States registry.
Q. But you don't know of any particular ship?
A. No, I haven »t looked into that. Of course
that is a matter which is primarily under private
direction. The shipping companies send their
ships where they will. We assume that one will
there, but that is not based on any
checkup with the companies.
Q, I wondered sir, whether it would be normal pro-
cedure for the United States government, to send
notice to the shipping companies that the strait
is considered open or whether everybody is suppo3ea
to know it?
A, Well, I think that everyone is supposed to have
read the newspapers in that respect, particularly
if they are in the shipping business, -*u
At the Tuesday, March 26, press conference the
Secretary of State faced the same line of questioning. The
only significant modification he made at this conference was
a declaration that *'I think that a certain amount of ship-
ping is or shortly will be passing through the straits."-* 1
Although the United States had committed herself to
Israel to exercise the right of free and innocent passage
in return for a withdrawal in Sinai, the Secretary of State
now was attempting to give the impression that it was up to
'ew York Times, March 6, 195 7,










American free enterprise which now would be compelled by
30ine inner mysterious force to reap the benefits of the
newly developed port which would be "attracting" shippin .
This is a difficult statement to accept on face val
On the one hand, Eilat in April, 1957, had little
:imercial interest for American shipping unless a profitable
charter arrangement made calling at Eilat and blacklist!
worthwhile. The difficulties of unloading petroleum into
storage tanks made such a. voyage expensive and the pipeline
north to Beersheba, a tiny b* inch jump pipe, mm not
scheduled to be tested until April 15. On the other har;
.
,
there was a kernel of truth to the statement. The United
States would certainly not 'send 1' a warship up the Gulf and
the Unitea States Merchant Marine was a congress of inde-
pendent shipowners and operators.
If such a venture was planned, the first week in
April was unquestionably the best time to do it in the
political context. Tensions had cooled considerably,
V2
Richaras was reporting civil reception in the Arab world^
and State, viewing the Jordanian situation with a weather
eye, was probably anxious to extricate the United States
government from its promise to Israel.
Accordingly, arrangements were completed sometime
Daily press reports of the trip are confusii, ,
See text of Ambassador Richards 1 radio and television address
on May 9, 1957, reporting on the trip to the American people.









dur. ie last week in March ©r the first week in April by
the Israeli National Petroleum Company to purchase a ship-
load of crude oil at Abadan consigned to Capetown, Union of
South Africa, on an American flag; vessel. The Israeli
National Petroleum Company, DELEK, had a charter arrangement
of lone, stanc. . ith a certain North Atlantic Marine Company
which operated a fleet of tankers owned by dummy corporations
whose capital stock was completely owned by the same indi-
vidual who owned Morth Atlantic Marine, In effect, there-
fore, the ship which was selected for the mission was owned
by the Fairfield Steam Ship Corporation in name but in fact
wa3 owned by North Atlantic* The president and sole owner
of both corporations was Samuel H. Wang, 33 Wang himself, a
Polish Jew by birth, was active in American Zionist circles
in the late forties and through the influence of a close
friend, Stanley linger, did most of his shipping business
with the Israeli government, linger, a vice president of
North Atlantic Marine, had been employed by the American
Israeli Steamship Company from August, 194&, when it was
v
vity of New York, County of New York, County
Clerks Office, public records of incorporation with amend-
ments uhereto for the American Bulk Carrier® Incorporated,
North Atlantic Marine Co., Inc., Fairfield Steamship Cor-
poration, Fairfield was one of eleven dummy corporations
which owned the eleven ships operated by North Atlantic and
was probably named after Fairfield Road in Great Neck, N.Y.,
where Wang lives with his family* (From Dun ana Bradstreet,
Inc.) There is nothing unusual about this arrangement, al-









originally incorporated, to February, 1953, when he resigned
as Port Captain to work for Wang* 34
The vessel itself was the "S.S* Kern Hills," a war-
time T-2 tanker built at Salusito, California, in 1945. It
was one of five operated during 1957 by North Atlantic
Marine although the operating arrangements between North
Atlantic and the duimny corporations which "owned* its ships
was so fluid that its fleet waxed and waned monthly keeping
one step ahead of the Egyptian blockade where necessary,** 1'
The capta the "Kern Hills" was Glenn E, Mosely,
whose thirty-eighth birthday was celebrated on March 21,
1957, as the ship was inbound to Abadan. The ship was
beinf operated as a tramp through the Caribbean during late
1956 and Mosely was living in New Orleans, although the home
port of the ship, once North Atlantic took it over, was New
York, 8 crew was American, a union crew, most of them
signed on at Galveston on January 6, 1957, for "various
ports of the Caribbean and Atlantic and any other voyage,"-*
^Dun and Bradstreet, Inc.
3%ang declared a petition of bankruptcy on January
16, I960, The involved ownership arrangements during 195&-
195# were too complicated for Lloyds Registry . of Shipping
(London? Lloyds Ltd., 1955, 1956, 1957 and 195*0, Vol. I, t0
c up with but the ownership is traced in the annual edi-
tions of U,3, Army, Corps of Engineers, Transportation Lines
pn the Atlanti c t Gulf and Pacific J3oasts (Washington: Govern-
menfTrint ffl c e / 1956 ana 195 7) ,
^Shipping Articles for the "3.S. Kern Hills," Tear






After its tramp trip through the Caribbean in
January (where, at Aruba, British «est Indies, ad on
its last crew member on January 23), -
-P sailed for
Abadf. n late in February and arrived on the
Persian Gulf at the end of March
»"
After ehc layover en luXf, it loaded 15, ^OC
tons of crude, and 1,000 tons of fuel «d d, according to
arran. with North Atlantic, set for Capetown on
April 3, Meanwhile, the actual initiative In the political
arrangements seeras to havr by the i
State knew the "Kern Hi "' was in the Mi East and it
was awar the charter arrenfwnenta with DELEK, After a
series of conferencea in Washington during the last days of
March, Israel pressed the Israeli request
for 1 < of the American promises and agreement
MM MA! , st with relief," that the "Kern Hills"
woulc the job. Accordingly , Mosely received instruc-
tions at sea from DELEK te deviate from his original destin-
ation deliver the cargo at Eilat.^
J
'Recol, on of crew member who requests anonymity,
***] is according to a source which is, at best,
second hand, It has been included hers because it ties in
with ot.h nee settle: I time context the author
does not and cannot vouch for its va
•^Despite Mr, V I to the contrary,
blanket clearance for & la to visit Eilat
not been formally given at this point although he niay well
have been to th« statement of March 5»






oh, a. .ns position at
Sharm el- Shaikh at di . ik Saturday aiming. The weather
was poc* to a dust storm or the Sinai peninsula and
as it pa Has Nasrani, the old signalling station where





reetinga rar« axehang 1 urith fcha United Katieai
ffcrea and a flare signal I from the shore. Earlier, the
ship had been shall i in the Red Sea ci sight by
Storttea," an American destroyer on patrol attae)
to the Middle -..a. When she answered "Eiia
,
"Stormes" had signalled "Good luck" a .-. luck seems
to have been a of the day,^
ortly alter three on Saturday afternoon, April 6,
Mot rapped anchor as close to the shore at Eilat as he
could, having brer, boar f the Eilat harbor master from a
rowboat as he approached, Eilat was technically closed on
Sat .
, U »ay, but this rule was aaglactad on
this particular Sabbath. As soon as the pleasantries were
excha
,
a twin-necked sea-pipe was floated out to the
ship and connected to the main dischai. . pe on the
Egy ,-•' view of the progr ag made with Nasser, some
appr;. on was felt over a Saudi statement the pi ^s
week that raaffira ha Saudi intention to "maintain t>.
blockade," See the New York Time s, March 2?, 1957, Sai
troops were at Aqaba h,
*^T account eorreap* point for point with press











deck of the tar. This was *« little out of the ordinary"
for Mosely,. but mittc h spe. unloading into
the storage tanks on the quay, ifaich were to hold the crude
until th <uld take it the following weak. Sea-
pipe unl*_- ricky, but all went well.
The unloading took thirty-six hours, After a rest
a swim in the Gulf , the crew had the ship outbound from
Eilat Monday evening at midnight, This wa3 arranged so that
the straits could be c-rv ty morn-
llftgj • Mosely was afra: iatir aused
Enterprise channel in the darkness. The beacons were un-
lighted and he had noted the previous weekend that the buoys
gave a very pt :dar reflection.
On April 19, the 1 was piped from the
stora * th the ne. :Iine and Israel marked
the successful delivery of her first Persian Gulf crude
through the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba, It was a pitiful
drop in the bucket to be sure, but the Middle East would
never be the same,
t were now two countries with frontage and
ea on the Mediterranean and Red Sea.
evaluation of the significance of the passage of
the "Kern almost wholly on the viewpoint of
This dat difficult to substan and the ira~
pr< en here may be in error. The pipeline was tested








the evaluate , The « of the openlr
the Gulf and the §1 ons Emergency
Force at Sharm el~Sh obvio - ut did the
pas an America*-: .• . vessa. ; rices
just described mat i situation in eiti:
way?
In cout one C train north-
bound shipping I ad been patrolled by fchi ... it*
"Kiznak" almost as soon as the military camp had end'
Leas than a w -f'ter r 5ts he- n fired, the
Israel: merchant ship "Queen o had anchored off
Tiran**"~ and on December 26 the nak" arrived from Haifa
and Ellat was opened as a. ;1 base." The first Israeli
ship to transit Its waited until June 4, 1957$ when
the o ship "Atlit" sailed from Djibouti, French Soma:
land, to make a test trip north, arriving at £ on
Ju .'": -
What value was there in testing the blockade? While
there was a cer moral" or /mental significance in
delivering cr he first time, several more trench-
ant political questions remain to be answered,**"*
^Although the "Queen of Sheba" did not transit t!
straits, The voyage probably had two object -to replenish
the Israeli gar- ana to act as a "feeler" to • the






W*3 frequently claimed that the voyage established
a precedent of innocent passage. This is net true, It estab-









Or ore a ; he WO
pre I Ltfe the conte whic<' m*
plished, fcJb ,? h$ hat i
April, 1957. In. ®- sense, •"- a
-a beginning for Israel, In a certain
emotional sense, ftl States in {
harder sense oi " the end of
the »•] :)f definite, put I tents to
Israel r it also o a phase of American policy?
.e positioning of an inter] In
Egyptian territc. - ptian consent, conces-
sions were made to insure t. at this consent would hi
and, once | , I It Did the fa.^. UNEF
prese the signalling st.at.ion at Ras Nasrani indicate
a will; 3se, albeit uanublitieVf
,
to "put up" with
passage through 'sspite the formal -ition
of t kade?
The question, of Israel.!, access to the Gulf is
directly dependent on Israeli access to the Negeb; I
access r, -b is stlj o- ?nt on the so-called
"final" settlement fee Arab-Israeli War, Can it be
argued fch Lts £ilat open for international trade, the
question of Israel- tewa ib, one of the p*.
nial major issues of the conflict, is at least political
carry
i
a Gulf crude, and in the abstract,





finalize:** Is I to ai r that in return for
X, Nasser surrendered any future
claim-.. ht have made that Israel further modify h
territorial 8 alon i Isr^ rtian frontier?
Is there .- in the 3ment that an even
trade oceurrea in late 1956 CM early 1957— Suez for the
Gulf of Aqaba?
The theoretical quest.! victory and defeat in
the exercie arms is another thorny problem* Who really
won and who really lostt
ally, did the opening of the Gulf mark a turn::
point in Arab-Israeli affairs and is an eventual solution
; onflict more likely or more politically feasible.
.: it?
These are some of the questions which must be
U






Throughout this study the p has bee- ;uently
mad© that the ©Tents of the Middle .'risis of 1956 ended
in a ^victory ?f for Isr a© opening of the Gulf of Aqaba,
Two basic questions deiermined the major stf wive problem
of research—the r'how f! and the "why,"
In exploring the how , an examination has been made
of the geopolitics of the Gulf and the implication of the
Egyptian Blockade on certain relationships that pertained
to Israel. The course of the military and diplomatic
maneuvers to guarantee Israeli access through the Strait
of Tiran form an essential part of this exploration as does
the effort of t .nal community, whose stake li
the ga.ie was far mor< , ^dural than substantive s to restore
if not stal least a brake to the Spiralling instability,
The efforts of the . .itions Secretary General to provide
the fjfi tor settlement, and the efforts itary
of State o ad St provide the focus—thess
have been impori arts :>! the how . So also have been the
fleeting glimpse Yoffe and Gl. DSely who as






prominence HkM history of txj t waterway ob-
bcv. rner
The second problem, the question cf rwhy," remains
to be- answered
»
was there a >ry for Israel?
The Theo retics of Victory
Victory is relative to defeat
,
As nations act to maximize ir values, however,
the ities of ill's in the modern political conte
tend to blurr this relationship as national action in the
moder :omes open-ended, a non- zero -sun game in
which a ga : count. -..es not automatically become
an equivalent loss for another, In analyzing the notion of
victory however, bearing this factor in mind, a conceptual
spectrum nay be erected which spans a framework whose
parameters are absolute victory on one end and complete and
total defeat on the other. The simplified way of looking
at this spectrum attempts to force it to do what it cannot
dc If a nation is ;'better off" after a particular maneuver
has been completed it was before it began, the simpli-
fied concept of "victory" is applied; if the nation is worse
off than when it started, the condition is called "defeats
Unfortunately for she simplicity of this method, "start
and "ends" are t uted to historical occurrences only in








, B r afl,>* o;fs Iff
133
in the c- Ing oi t% political world
where si - motivation ially
•xclusiv 3 of a single %%**%#% used
as criteri as plannc , ade an tm
forme ^iaa c .cig
forces and co
In exn .g the inpn spectrum of success,
are an . .triable s which det m pos: I on the
spectrur:, : a far greater degree of accuracy than that
which Ban I temined by the si | >tic "seaman's eye."
Th. jf these inputs is the process concept—the
38 established in the order of pi the values
that are intended to be ma ed in any .. uieuver. For
a nation with a high degre: - what might be called political
solve . 5se values are likely to be more procedural than
substantive. The United States and the Soviet m, for
example j despite some substantive differences, are engaged in
the current Cold Var for what are largely procedural issues
a
Each :1th the ct m the procedural base on which
Id po to be conducted* For a nation, almost
politically b ipt, as was, 141 pie, the Republic of
the Congo dur: of 1961, the issue .? the
substantive sheer survivv , In the Arab-Israeli
difficulties in the 1947, there





by the eurraaar e. m Israel; leetives, as best
da/tan. «Wt operation analysi*?, war© punitive action
agair^ - fa4ay& - ia in Gassa* political leverage to
embarrass or un th« opening of tha Gulf of
Aqaba» It is Iff | remember that it day to day-
tyranny' of tha Hi basket in. a Foreign Ministry, priority of
ebjectlv .nstantly shift and change. Whatever the
prlo; 4var» the first and aaost obvious input to the
deterr .on of success or failure mist 4m .he
object intandad by I mwmi" undar analysis.
• second input to tha pa . _U;tex-raining success
or failure ia the Cjgst concept , the calculated bearable loss*
which a ration is v. ag to accept in order to fulfill its
process concept. If, for example, ration A has a dispute
with gj . but feels that any cost expended to settle
the dist- ffeW :^uid ba unbearable, there will
be nc . 11 ; uver and consequently no question of success or
failure* The dispute wi. •-. Wh«n the threshold
of bears
< Mil is exps to provide the flexibility for
seme kind of risk, the world witnesses what is known as an
interna: 3 crisis and so are the history books filled.
Usually, whan this threshold of bearable loss applies to
ends, (or, in other words, wh . th sides feel they can
afford t m the entire dispute) the question is able
to be settled by judicial nieane.
-'/hen the threshold applies




only to means (how many titles, how many planes) t
crisis becomes acute.
The third input is t ^u concept , the under-
lying psychological context in which the objectives are
entertained and the costs calculated • The United States
and the United Kingdom, for example, have between them a
certain ological relationship which detenu ines that a
con.' between them will be "waged" in accordance with
an extremely delicate and low threshold of cost and bitter-
ness j ;<3ly dependent he overall world situation in
which such a conflict might occur. The United States and
the Soviet Union have a different conflict concept, to be
sure, which determ • ^:he level of action which will be
taken by either sic vbabiy based on a somewhat higher
threshold of bitto Be, The Cold War with its undulating
currei. tension is an excellent example of the way in
which this conflict concept changes from time to time in
accordance with the overall world political situation. The
Arabs and the Jews f the extreme case perhaps, have an
elaborately worked out conflict concept between then:, which
determines almost automatically the choices each side feels
it must make at any moment in t relationship and which






Based on theas three variables, therefore, it might
be said that absolute victory In any act intended to maximize
substantive or procedural values is defined as a situation
in which c ire achieved in the order of established
priority at or below the calculated bearable cost with a
major change in the psychological relationship between the
antagonists which renders the conflict irrelevant.
>rreap to the absolute victory of one pro*
tagonist is the idea of absolute defeat on the part of the
h®v. lute defeat then would be defined in terms of
capitular. Ion (or the at. of objective achievement )~
followi- bearable cost with a major change ie
psychological relationship rendering the antagonist irrele-
vant. In defeat the loser loses more than he feels he can
bear and his influence on the • em | reduced to zero.
In nuclear war, a preoccupation of the world since
August, 1945 j much has been written on the thesis that
absolute y is impossible and in the rhetoric of the
framewhat erected above, it is simple to see the logic of
this position. Nuclear war, regardless of objectives achieved,
imposes unbearable cost on both sides removing any outcome
from the "absolute" end of the spectrum. The determination
of relative victory and defeat is quite another matter.
iThe case of loss I I absence of the






In the old fashioned kind, of war, though, there can
be an absolute winner. Whether it is called ''limited" war
or ^conventional'' war in honor of its less sophisticated
aponry or its long history-, one of the major objectives
the institution we know of as the United Nations has been
t0 prevent such a situation from occurring, The rationale
of collective security is designed to prevent wins and .losses
in war, if not to prevent the wars which give wins and losses,
But if there are statutory provisions and political
precedents in the modern world to prevent absolute victory,
ere are still opportunities for relative or qualified vic-
tories* If, for example, objectives are realized at or be-
lew programed cost although the conflict worsens, a certain
kind of qualified victory can be claimed. If some but not
ail objectives are realized at, below or above programmed
costs, then a different kind of victory has ensued. As can
m, the permutations are almost endless.*
2
An additional complication arises in conflict analysis
in which the number of .antagonists is greater than the classic
two* Where three, four or more nations act at cross purposes
with ': - g, rariable objectives shifting in priority on
an B& noc baste in a context sensitive to extranaous political
considerations (Hangaryj the American election) victory and
defeat became so difficult to identify that the exercise losi












In the preceeding chapters it haa been indicated
that during the summer of 1956 the government of Israel
appraised the chronic Arab problem and examined its own
objectives in the deteriorating political situation in the
Middle East. At the risk of over-simplification, these
objectives fell into three basic categories; Egypt, Gaza
and Aqaba. Sometime during the summer a modification in
the cost concept occurred in that the threshold of bearable
cost was expanded to include large scale military action
with the anticipated loss level shifted correspondingly
higher . Finally, the Israeli analysis of what has h&en
called the conflict concept above indicated that the psycholo-
gical relationship between herself and her neighbors had
reached the point where nothing was relevant except the con-
flict. The Arab military arrangements with Egypt crystallized
this position and plans were made for what became the Sinai
Following the nationalization of the Canal on July
26, a similar appraisal had been made by England and France.
Still another similar appraisal was made in Cairo but in the
case of the Egyptians, the actual maneuver made them the ob-
jects rather than the subjects of action and they had only
static objectives to consider after July.
The Sinai War began at 5-00 P.M. on the evening of












the 5th of November. 3 Analysing the Israeli political posi-
tion three months later, the following judgments must be
made:
I* Sgypt . Israel was, if anything, worse off than
before with regard to political leverage over Sgypt. There
were several factors behind this tun? of events, not the
least of which was the American attitude toward the Arab
cause in general and the growth in Arab prestige as a result
of the political ramifications of the Suez invasion, the
Soviet notes and the split in the western alliance.
2 * Raiaa . She was somewhat better off in Gaza than
she was before although her objective of destroying Egyptian
capability to field fedayeen attacks from the Strip was not
able to be determined. IJhile Egyptian supremacy in adminis-
trative matters was restored, the presence of the United
Nations Emergency Force guaranteed at least a modicum of
improvement over what was there before.
3* Aqaba . Unquestionably better off than before.
Such was the recapitulation of the process concept.
Tiie cost factor was almost negligible. The total
casualty coxmt was a delightful surprise, The added military
prestige and the captured equipment left her with a profit.
3
Authors sympathetic to Israel delight in referring
to the Sinai campaign as the 100 Hour War," which, even if






















^e conflict concept is lass simple to generalize.
Anything less than unbearability is a relative improvement.
After the defeat of the Egyptian armies in Sinai, the conflict
remained no less bearable politically probably but the "iron
grip'* with which she had been grasped was broken and remains
so to this day,
In achieving one of her major objectives, partially
achieving another despite frustration in her third, con-
siderably below programmed cost with a slight lowering of
the general tenor of the conflict, Israel must be placed on
the victor side of the spectru.
A relative victor, to be sure, but more the victor
than vanquished.
Similarly, Egypt in retaining sovereignty over the
Canal (and indeed strengthening it), in increasing her
political influence at the loss of her blockade on the Gulf
of Aqaba and her high military casualties in a slightly
diminished atmosphere of tension with Israel—probably a
negative value for her—also emerged on the victorious side.
It would be incorrect to say that Egypt ''won' 1 a victory in
the same sense that Israel did, Both won, nevertheless;
but if both won, who lost?
Earlier it was noted that the problems of the world
have become increasingly ©pen*ended, that more and more often
both sides can win without a corresponding loss by either side.
The loss, however, must be absorbed someplace. And so it was
in the Kiddle East Crisis.
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Actually} the world lost
>
The Defeat
The institution of war was invented as a normal
necessary adjunct of the nation-state system. In the absence
of an international legislature or executive, relations
between states resembled relations between individuals under
primitive American and English tort law, where redress for
wrong was an individual affair. While the solutions pro-
duced by war often bore no relationship to the rightness or
wrongness of the victor Ts case, since the strongest or luckiest
always won, the institution itself survived virtually unscathed
until it threatened to destroy the very parameters of the
society it was intended to serve.
In 1945, the United Nations was established by the
states who, realizing the inability of war to finalize
political solutions , intended to abolish it by mutual consent.
In abolishing the legal right to individual redress, it was
hoped that political conciliation would become a substitute
for war, an institution which could perform the same task
that war had performed with a greater degree of "'accuracy"
and with far less expense. Unhappily, what emerged was rather
than a substitute for war, merely an alternative to it.
When Israel jumped off on Monday, October 29th, she
put the traditional institution of war to the test. She had
tried diplomacy and diplomacy did not work. She resorted to








do around the green table. In eschewing diplomacy from the
very beginning as a way to settle the conflict, the Arab
were every bit as much to blame as Israel for this turn of
events. Had action in the United Nations ever been a sub-
stitute for war j the whole thing would have been impossible.
In the absence of a substitute, the alternative could only
work if both sides wanted it to work.
Force was called in to do the job,
Force seems to have prevailed until the states on
the sidelines realized what was happening and remembered
that it was 1956 and not 1^56, The United Nations Emergency
Force was established to remind the principals of the date.
To the extent that the status quo was changed by the use of
force, regardless of the substantive issues involved, the
world could be said to have suffered a defeat.
--tunat^iy, it was a relative defeat.
Dag Hammerskjold personnified the objectives of the
world community, or to remain in the framework erected above,
the process concepts. They were entirely procedural; the
important thing was the way things got done. But insofar as
the procedural objectives of peace, order and stability were
only insured with the expense of an at least unplanned~for
cost in a psychological context Routing new utility to













As a final section of any study such as this, it is
useful to evaluate the impact of the opening of the Gulf of
Aqaba on subsequent developBients in the Middle East. Two
extremes—exaggeration and belitt it—must be avoided.
The first a,nd most obvious effect of the opening
of the Gulf was on the Israeli economy. With her backdoor
to the east, a new self-confidence marked her economic
policies during the years that followed the battle of Sharm
el-Sheikh. While the 100,000 tons oi cargo moved through
there annually through I960 represented only fifty port-
days operations, it was a huge assurance to her. The 18
inch pipeline was recently completed and parallels the new
Beer3heb ilway but petroleum discoveries in the
Heletz area have taken at least some of the edge off her
dependence on the Eilat deliveries. Tourism, on the other
hand, has b -g industry in Eilat and the fact that
the Israelis up north now can go south for their annual va-
cations seems important in a country in which too few things
like that are ever considered
.
On the other hand, the overall effectiveness of the
United Nations operations probably did enough psychological
good for the U.N» to be it out in the long run. This is
somewhat beside the point.
•i\
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The political implications were certainly positive
.
As a result of the continues ana effective United Nations
presence at Sharm el- ii stability in the area has gone
up and down since 1957 hut the presence of the United Nations
has aecoiu;. >re st- *y than it has discouraged,
Saudi el of sovereignty over Tiran and their annual
threa-: re-institute the blockade seem to be taken seriously
by no one; the blue flag flies over the minaret at Sharm el-
virtually all nations have dipped their flag to it
at one tins or another since the "Kern Hills •'" The blockade
in the 8 anal has had a curious history but in balance
Israel seems to have learned to live with it and only makes
propagan ieage out of it when the climate is ripe.
The military ication? hs.ve been somewhat more
indirect j» but no less substantial. The experience has law
pressed the Arab world with the fact that Israel will be dis-
placed from Palestine only by brute force, and that brute
force (even obsolete brute force manufactured in Czechoslovakia
in 1946) remains a symbol of anti-Zionism. Arms and the
buildup of arcse in the Kiddle East therefore have important
ic political implications and it was by this route that
the Soviet Union was able to gain a toehold in the area. Military
advisors and hardware, were an important part of the Communist
economic offensive through 1961 and although follow-up in this
area posed the greatest single threat to the west from 1958
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the West has managed to weather the storm—by default perhaps.
The bottom fringes of the emerging middle class, now finding
its political voice in the new revolution in the Middle East,
like to see arms in the market-place on holidays, and arms is
what they get.
The opening of the Gulf in the way it was accomplished
impressed many in the West with the seriousness of the dogma
of positive neutralism which as a result, is becoming better
understood in the places where it should have been understood
in 1951.
But the most overwhelming effect of the opening of
the Gulf of Aqaba has not been on Israel, but on Egypt.
Arab-Israeli antagonism and the Arab thesis that
Israel does not exist is petulent, somewhat ridiculous but
above all, unreal. While Nasser has a reputation for petulence
and is on occasion somewhat ridiculous, the Suez Canal has
made a realist out of him and the Gulf of Aqaba has helped
him understand himself. It is submitted that the mystique
of anti-Israelism is as important to Nasser as a shibboleth
as is the traditional regard for motherhood of Pennsylvania
Avenue. Most Arabs need Israel and would feel vaguely uncom-
fortable if it were not there to disparage; Nasser seems to
recognize this. He also seems to understand, more than any
other Arab figure, that Israel is not going out of business
next week without a self-defeating clash which would signify








on the Gulf of Aqaba matter seems to bear this out,
Whether or not he may have looked at it in quite
this way, Nasser traded the Gulf of Aqaba for the Suez
Canal in 1957 and the Sues Canal is by far more important
to Egypt than Aqaba ever night have been* To say that he
took a substantive gain for a procedural loss is possibly
a contrived way of describing a situation which was done
for two very definite and quite realistic reasons, both
political.
In the first place, Nasser was enough of a realist
to understand that the acquiescence of the United States
was the deciding factor in Mareh, 1957, which tipped the
scales in the direction of the Sphinx, The price was small
on the scale of values who had a huge job to do in his own
way. Aqaba was that price. By consolidating his political
position he was in a far better position to face the world
and to gain customers for the Sues Canal Authority
»
The second reason is more subtle. It was politically
impossible for Nasser or any other Arab leader to retain or
regain ascendency in the Arab political world after 1957
by a soft line on Israel, On the other hand, it would have
been equally Impossible for Nasser to cultivate the impression
that he was the responsible Canal operator in the face of
Israeli claims that her port of Eilat was blockaded by force,
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her economic life was being strangled by Nasser 1 s maritime
policy. World opinion was particularly important at a time
when the World Bank was considering what became of its $56.5
million loan in 1959 * When the Egyptian government somewhat
"graciously 7; allowed the United Rations into the Share :1-
Sheikh and abandoned its Blockade on the Gulf, It certainly
did not weaken its position on 2NM
The Egyptian policy on the Israeli access to Suez
would seem to make sense only if this interpretation--world
opinion—were part of the interpretation of that policy also.
The Canal policy is curious. Explicitly; the policy prohibits
Israeli ships but not Israeli cargoes from the Canal, In
practice, the Canal has been occasionally closed to certain
Israeli cargoes on certain ships for no clearly discernable
reasons. The most famous case, the 'Inge Toft," was a Danish
ship chartered to an American firm hauling stone from Haifa
to the Far East, At Port Said, the Egyptian government barred
the Canal to her passage and attempted to seize the cargo.
This was on fey 21, 1959*
Coincident with this, Nasser and Kassim were engaged
in a bitter propaganda battle during a time when the United
Arab Republic had m ised overt support for the Mosul re-
volt and there seemed to be a serious bid by the USAR to
overthrow the Iraqi government. Was there a connection be-
tween the propaganda war and the seizure of the 'IngQ Toft,"













In the light of this, and remembering the develop-
ment projects carried out at Eilat while the Gulf was still
firmly shut, it is probable that 1 wing nationalization
of the Canal in July, M understood the political im-
possibilities of the Aqaba Blockade as well as Ben Gurion
understood the ^ability of its terffi.inat.ion.
The overall ii 1 nation or effect of the opening of
the Gulf on the ultimate solution of the Palestine is
negligible* If the remove of the Blockade had occurred in
an exclusively legal context and if the controversy had been
waged in strictly legal terms, the effect would have been
greater of course , The removal of the blockade by Egypt
would be argued by Israel to be the legal underwriting for
her sovereignty in the Negeb and consequently her right to
"exist'1"'' within the 1949 Armistice Lines, But on an effective
level, the purely legal has little bearing.
The simple fact seems to be that the Arab-Israeli dis-
pute is not a legal dispute; that the blockade of the Gulf
of Aqaba was no more legal than was its subsequent removel
and that the exclusive application of international law to
solve the conflict was useless after 1947*
The conflict is soluble , but it is not soluble in a
court of law unless a sweeping change occurs in the political
climate which would make a settlement on legal grounds rele-
vant* With the Gulf open, the l significant problem |
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two situations are sor.:ewhat analogous. Israel will be
required to make a diplomatic concession (repatriation or
compensation) in the same vein as she made the diplomatic
"concession" to withdraw in favor of the United Nations in
Sinai, The Arabs will have to make a practical concession
by integrating the refugees who refuse repatriation into
their own societies, just as Egypt made the practical con-
cession of refraining from reoccupying Sharm el-Sheikh.
Such a settlement is quite a long way off.
Finally, with regard to the United States, what did
the State Department gain in its course of action with re-
gard to the Gulf of Aqaba from February to April, 1957?
Increased flexibility.
And flexibility characterizes, as nothing else, the
policy which the United States has managed to maintain with
the developing world ever since. There have been false
starts and blind alleys, to be sure, but in extricating her-
self from the bitter inter-domestic problem of the Arab-
Jewish world 57, the United States was able tc meet the
Soviet economic offensive on much more realistic grounds.
Indications seem to point to the fact that by 1962, flexibility
has been the sing3 t important asset in American foreign
policy in the Middle East. It is the kind of flexibility
that has been able to accept positive neutralism on its own




th the help of the experience in the Aqaba matter,
an important lesson seems to have been learned in Washington.
The crises which have vexed State since 1957 have been
crises—in Berlin, in Cuba, in Laos—which have been born
out of situations in which the flexibility which should have
been maintained has been gobbled up. Where the American
policy was able to maintain this flexibility, important
crises have been averted. This flexibility is the ability
to remain free of the moral obligation to make a choice in
a pre-deternined direction. It is the ability to have
choices to make based not on a previous policy "set" but
on realistic considerations of national int-erest.
The United States, in developing a policy based on
the ability to choose, has added to its political solvency.
The Arab- Israeli dispute will be solved one day when
both sides acquire enough of this solvency to realize that
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